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Dr. Iryna Marchuk*

ABSTRACT

The Article examines an array of important legal issues
that arise out of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
InternationalCriminal Court by Ukraine, a non-State Party to
the Rome Statute, within the framework of Article 12(3) with
respect to the alleged crimes against humanity committed
during the 2014 Maydan protests (Declaration I) and the
alleged war crimes committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea
(Declaration II). It provides an in-depth analysis of
constitutional law issues linked to the acceptance of the
jurisdiction by Ukraine and discusses its possible implications
on the proceedings before the ICC. The Article criticizes the ICC
Prosecutor's overly stringent approach with regard to the
interpretationof crimes against humanity in the context of the
Maydan protests and her decision not to proceed with the first
declaration. The Article further argues that ignoring the
situation in Ukraine is detrimentalto the interests of justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article is a timely contribution to the debate on the
relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
Ukraine, a non-State Party to the Rome Statute. The debate has
gained considerable momentum in light of Ukraine's acceptance of
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute for the alleged crimes against humanity committed during
the 2014 Maydan protests and subsequent acceptance of jurisdiction
for the alleged crimes associated with the escalation of the conflict in
eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation. The Article situates the debate on the ad hoc jurisdiction
acceptance in the broader context by addressing the clash between
Ukrainian constitutional law and international law. This tension is
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exemplified by the failed ratification attempts of the Rome Statute1
following the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine that found
the Rome Statute contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. 2 It raises a
number of important legal questions on the interplay between
constitutional law and international law, in particular whether the
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC by the Ukrainian
government was in conformity with constitutional procedure and
whether such acceptance overrules the earlier decision of the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which required the amendment of
the Constitution of Ukraine in order to accommodate the jurisdiction
of the ICC.
The Article also discusses a number of legal challenges
associated with the first declaration lodged by the Ukrainian interim
government and critically reflects on the recent decision of the ICC
Prosecutor not to seek the Pre-Trial Chamber's authorization to
proceed with the investigation. The Article argues that by taking an
overly narrow approach to the interpretation of the contextual
elements of crimes against humanity, the Prosecutor made an
unfortunate decision that stripped the judges of the opportunity to
decide whether the crimes, which were committed during the
demonstrations in Ukraine, meet the threshold of crimes against
humanity. The Article argues that the Prosecutor of the ICC has
missed a golden opportunity by deciding not to act on the first
declaration, as this could have been a landmark case capable of
enhancing the fragile legitimacy of the ICC that is largely plagued by
African bias claims with respect to its choice of situations.
The Article also addresses a number of legal intricacies linked to
the second declaration that, in an unexpected twist, was recently
lodged by the Ukrainian government and extended the jurisdiction of
the ICC for an indefinite period of time with respect to the crimes
associated with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of
Crimea. Although the prospects of the ICC Prosecutor acting on the
second declaration are bleak at the moment, the Article argues that
missing this opportunity to act would be detrimehital to the interests
of justice and damaging to the public image of the Court, which would
be perceived by the victims and international community as incapable
of dealing with ongoing conflicts.

1.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
KoHcmumyzpi ru Cy6 YKparuu (Constitutional Court of Ukraine), BucQO6oK
2.
Koucmumy4iiiuozo Cydy Ypat'u y cnpaei 3a KoHcmumyydinuM no~anwwM flpemudesma Yxpa'nu
npo nadanuw

euceoacy uzo~o siOnoeionocmi Koncmumyli" YKpabiu PUMCbMOzO

Cmamymy

Mimcuaponoo KpuminazbBoeo cydy (Ruling on the Submission of the President of Ukraine
Regarding Conformity of the Constitution of Ukraine with the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court), Case No 1-35/2001, 11 July 2001 [hereinafter
Koncmumy i~su CyO Ypa~uu].

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

326

II. ROME

[VOL. 49:323

STATUTE CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE?

Ukraine is a signatory to the Rome Statute, although it has yet
to ratify the Statute. 3 The ratification procedure was stalled by the
ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which declared the
Rome Statute's principle of complementarity to be contrary to the
Constitution of Ukraine. 4 Despite the fact that fifteen years have
elapsed since the Constitutional Court's ruling on its nonconformity
with the Ukrainian constitution, Ukraine has made miniscule
progress in ratifying the Rome Statute. However, hopes remain high
in light of the latest legislative initiative taken by members of
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukrainian parliament) in January 2015
to amend the Constitution of Ukraine. 5 Back in 2001, the proceedings
before the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which is tasked with
deciding on conformity of international treaties with the Constitution
of Ukraine, 6 were initiated by the then President of Ukraine, Leonid
Kuchma, who lodged an application on nonconformity of the Rome
Statute with a number of constitutional provisions. 7 Interestingly,
the President's submission was at odds with the official position of
Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which took an opposing stance
and publicly declared that it had not identified any impediments to
ratification of the Rome Statute. 8 The President's submission to the
Court focused on a number of key constitutional provisions that he
argued were contrary to the Rome Statute's provisions on immunities
(Art. 27), the principle of complementarity (Art. 1, 17, and 20),
surrender of nationals (Art. 89), and enforcement of prison sentences
(Art. 103 and 124). 9 In addition, he contended that the Rome Statute
was contrary to the constitutional provisions:

Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of the Assembly of
3.
States Parties visit to Ukraine, ICC-ASP-20141009-PR1048 (Sept 10, 2014) ("Ukraine
signed the Rome Statute on 20 January 2000.").
4.
See Koucmumyqiiiauii CyO YKpafuu, supra note 2, at § 2.8.
5.
HpoeKm 3axony npo enecensa auin O)ocmammi 124 Koncmumyyi" Yxpa'nu (ujo)o
eu3nauhA nojzoatcenb Puceoo cmamymy) (Draft Law of Ukraine on Amending Article 124
of the Constitution of Ukraine (with Regard to the Recognition of the Rome Statute)),
No 1788, 16 January 2015 [hereinafter Draft Law].
6.
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine also rules on conformity of national
legislation with the Constitution of Ukraine, interprets the Constitution and laws in
Ukraine, and gives opinion on conformity of the impeachment procedure with the
Constitution of Ukraine. See 3aKon Ypai'u 'fipo Koncmumyyinui4 Cyo YKpafnu' (Law of

Ukraine on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine), art. 13. (1996) [hereinafter Law on
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine].
7.
See Koncmumyqia YKpafnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 151 (Ukr.) (stating
that the President of Ukraine has the constitutional right to submit an application to
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, requesting the Court to make a determination on
the conformity of international treaties with the Constitution of Ukraine).

8.
9.

See Koncmumyyiduui4 CyO Ypafuu, supra note 2, § 1.
See id.
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1. on the role of Ukraine's prosecution office,
2. on the exercise of power by Ukrainian people directly or through elected
agents, and
3. on the legislative competence vested in the Ukrainian Parliament. 10

One of the central issues in the President's submission was the
incompatibility of a constitutional provision on immunities with the
11
Rome Statute's provision on irrelevance of official immunities. The
Constitution of Ukraine grants immunities to certain categories of
officials, namely the President of Ukraine, members of parliament,
and judges during their time in office. 12 However, in exceptional
circumstances, such as serious criminal allegations, immunities may
be waived through a parliamentary procedure of impeachment. 13 The
judges of the Constitutional Court held that Ukraine respected its
obligations under international law that it was not afforded
immunities for international crimes. 14 Although not referring to any
developed jurisprudence on the subject, the Court took a progressive
stance on the matter of immunities for international crimes. 15 The
ruling affirmed that the constitutional provision on immunities was
applicable only in the national context and, therefore, could not bar
the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. 16 A less progressive take on
immunities was advanced by a French counterpart, the Conseil
constitutionnel,in its judgment on January 22, 1999, which came to a
different conclusion by claiming that the president of France
effectively enjoyed immunities during his or her term in office, except
for the crime of high treason. 17 This divergence of opinions advanced
by constitutional courts in two different countries shows that the
clash between constitutional law and international law cannot always
be easily resolved. By undertaking a very narrow interpretation of
constitutional provisions on immunities in a national context, states

See id.
10.
See id. § 2.2.
11.
Koncmumyyiz Yepa'Hu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 80, 105, 126 (Ukr.).
12.
See id. art. 111 (outlining the procedure for impeachment of the President
13.
of Ukraine).
See Koncmumyqiiinui Cyd YKpa'Nu, supra note 2, § 2.2.
14.
In its reasoning, the Court, regrettably, did not resort to the analysis of a
15.
landmark Pinochet case on immunities before the House of Lords, which was the very
first attempt, in a national context, to address the matters of immunities for
international crimes. See Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate,
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R. (H.L.) 272 (Eng.); Regina v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 3 W.L.R. (H.L.)
1456 (Eng.).
See KoncmumyyiiHufi Cyd YepaTrnu, supra note 2, § 2.2.1.
16.
See C. ELLIoTr ET AL., FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2nd ed., 2006); Conseil
17.
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 98-408DC, Jan. 22, 1999, Rec
(Fr.).
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may act in breach of their already existing international obligations
enumerated in the international treaties that they have ratified (e.g.,
UN Genocide Convention), which explicitly prohibit immunities for
international crimes.1 8 It has been noted in the academic literature
that "a strict interpretation of constitutional provisions ... could
bring a state into conflict with international obligations which it has
already undertaken beyond the context of the ICC."' 9
The President's submission questioned the conformity of the
constitutional ban on extradition of Ukrainian nationals to another
state with the Rome Statute's provision on surrender of suspects into
the custody of the ICC. 20 The court distinguished between
"extradition" of nationals to another state and "surrender" of
nationals to an international court. 2 1 Whereas extradition of a state's
own national to another state is generally resisted due to the fear of
the state's concern with losing its grip on the handling of its own
domestic affairs, the surrender of a national to an international court,
which was established with participation of the state concerned and
does not have primacy over the national judicial system, is definitely
more acceptable to the ICC state parties and does not come across as
the
sovereignty. 22 In that regard,
national
undermining
Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the transfer of a Ukrainian
national to stand trial before an international court was in conformity
with Ukraine's international obligations. 2 3 When ratifying the Rome
Statute, some states took a different path and amended their
respective constitutional provisions on the ban of extradition. As an
example, Germany amended its constitutional provision on
extradition by explicitly allowing for the surrender of its nationals to
an international court. 24 On the other hand, Brazil chose not to
amend a specific constitutional provision on the ban of extradition
and resolved the situation by simply declaring its acceptance of the
25
jurisdiction of the ICC.
The judges also examined whether serving a prison term by
Ukrainian nationals in another member state would be in breach of

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
18.
art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
19.
H. Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International
CriminalCourt, 11 DUKEJ COMP. & INT'L. L. 5, 18 (2001).
See Koncmumyyinu5 Cyd YpaHu, supranote 2, § 2.3.
20.

21.

See id. § 2.3.1.

22.
See, e.g., H. Duffy & J. Huston, Other Common Constitutional Issues and
InterpretativeApproaches: Extradition, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC LEGAL
ORDERS, VOLUME I: GENERAL ASPECTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 42, 43-46 (C.
Kress & F. Lattanzi eds., 2000).

23.

See Koncmumyyibuufi Cyd Ypat'u, supra note 2, § 2.3.2.

GRUNDGESETZES FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic
24.
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. 1, art. 16(2) (Ger.), translationat http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englischgg/index.html.
25.
CONSTITUIAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5(4) (Braz.).
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the Constitution of Ukraine, as convicted persons could possibly be
deprived of enjoying full human rights protection as guaranteed by
the Constitution. 2 6 The Court held that if Ukraine did not wish its
convicted nationals to serve their sentence in another State Party to
the ICC, it could request to have the sentence enforced on its own
territory. 2 7 In designating the state where the sentence will be
enforced, the ICC is guided by generally recognized international
standards on the treatment of prisoners, as well as the views and
nationality of the convicted person. 28 In the judges' opinion, these
safeguards would generally preclude a situation in which the
convicted person ends up in a more disadvantageous position by
serving his or her sentence in a prison facility of another State Party
to the ICC that is in breach of the constitutional human rights
29
safeguards offered by the Ukrainian constitution to its nationals.
Additional constitutional provisions, which the former President
claimed were in conflict with the Rome Statute, included:
1. the role of Ukraine's prosecution office,
2. the exercise of power by Ukrainian people directly or through elected agents,
and
3. the legislative competence vested in the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna
30
Rada of Ukraine).

The judges considered none of these to be an impediment to the
ratification of the Rome Statute, having cited in support Article 9 of
the Constitution of Ukraine that recognizes "international
agreements that are in force and have been agreed to be binding by
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as part of the national legislation of
31
Ukraine."
The most contentious issue in the President's submission was
the compatibility of a constitutional provision on exclusive
jurisdiction of Ukrainian courts with the ICC's principle of
complementarity. 32 Unlike other international courts, the ICC
operates on the basis of the principle of complementarity, which
means that it complements, rather than substitutes, national
criminal proceedings. The ICC would only exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes within its jurisdiction if a State Party was unable or

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Koicmumyyif4u Cya YKparwu, supra note 2, § 2.7.
See id. § 2.7.2.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 103(3).
See Koncmumyyifiiu Cyi Ykparnu, supra note 2, § 2.7.2.
See id. §§ 2.4, 2.5, 2.8.
See id. (citing in support, Art. 9 Constitution of Ukraine).
See Koucmumyyiimnu Cyai YKpaYuu, supra note 2, § 2.1.
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33
unwilling to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.
As noted in the Rome Statute's commentary, the provision on
complementarity was carefully drafted to ensure that a State Party's
"sovereign right to try crimes committed on their territory would not
be encroached. '34 The judges of the Constitutional Court misread the
Rome Statute's provision on complementarity, and they concluded
that the complementary aspect of jurisdiction exercised by the ICC
could not be reconciled with the Constitution of Ukraine, which
regards the administration of justice as the exclusive prerogative of
35
national courts.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Ukraine is a signatory
to the European Convention of Human Rights and recognizes the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which
routinely deals with cases submitted by Ukrainian nationals on
human rights violations enshrined in the Convention. 36 The obvious
question that comes to mind as to how bringing a case before the ICC
is different from adjudicating a case in the ECHR, given that both
institutions represent international judicial institutions thatfollowing the Constitutional Court's narrow reading of the
Constitution of Ukraine-should not be entitled to rule on matters
within the exclusive competence of Ukrainian courts. In this regard,
the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the
individual's right to seek remedies for human rights violations in the
ECHR was guaranteed by Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine,
which could be invoked by a person who has exhausted all available
national remedies of human rights protection. 37 When comparing the
procedural framework of the ECHR and the ICC, the judges held that
the former was an auxiliary means to protect the individual's human
rights, whereas the latter was complementary to national
proceedings. 38 It is the complementary nature of the ICC jurisdiction
that the judges held as not being compatible with Article 124 of the
Constitution of Ukraine and, therefore, as hindering the ratification
of the Rome Statute.

33.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
34.
WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE 336 (2010).
35.
See KoHcmumy1inui Cyo YKpa.iu, supra note 2, § 2.1; see also KoncmumyY&i
YKparnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 124 (Ukr.).
36.
See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF
TREATY 005, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/
treaty/005/signatures?p.auth=fATFp2yA [https://perma.ccd9M7Q.CUS6] (archived Feb.
13, 2016) (showing that Ukraine signed the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 9 November 1995 and subsequently
ratified it on 11 September 1997).
37.
See KoncmumyyieHuii CyO YKpaYuu, supra note 2, § 2.1; see also Koecmumyqi
YXpanu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 55 (Ukr.).
38.
See id.
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The distinction made by the judges between the ECHR and ICC
is not entirely clear, as both courts may only assume jurisdiction
when national courts are no longer a viable option, and, therefore, it
is necessary for an individual to resort to the jurisdiction of the
ECHR or for a state to refer the case to the ICC. The wording of
Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine suggests that it only applies
to individuals whose human rights were violated. However, a broader
teleological reading of the Constitution does not impede the state
from seeking remedies for international crimes-the most serious
violations of human rights-that occurred on its territory. It should
also be noted that the ICC's victim participation framework is capable
of protecting the individual human rights of those who suffered harm
as a result of international crimes within the meaning of Article 55 of
the Constitution of Ukraine. 39 Victim participation in the ICC is
clearly in line with Article 55, which upholds the individual's right to
seek remedies for human rights violations, including the most serious
violations of human rights that constitute international crimes.
The interpretation of the principle of complementarity by the
judges of the Constitutional Court stems from the lack of
understanding of what complementarity entails. It is also worth
mentioning that the ruling was delivered in 2001, which was long
before the ICC construed the principle of complementarity in its
jurisprudence for the very first time in the context of the
admissibility proceedings involving Libya and Kenya. In the Gaddafi
admissibility decision, the Trial Chamber averred that "the principle
for national
a
preference
expresses
of
complementarity
40
investigations." Similarly, the Appeals Chamber in the Kenyatta et
al. case underlined that "[s]tates have the primary responsibility to
exercise criminal jurisdiction and the Court does not replace, but
complements them in that respect. '4 1 Article 17 of the Rome Statute
outlines a number of conditions that render a case inadmissible
before the ICC in favor of national jurisdictions. 42 The ICC cannot
assume jurisdiction over a case that is being investigated or
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is

39.
See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial
Chamber I (Jan. 18, 2008) (decision on victims' participation); H. Chung, Victim's
Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court
Clouding the Promise, 6 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. L. 459 (2008); I. Marchuk,
Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2006-2008, at 278 (A. Klip and S. Freeland eds.,
2014).
40.
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah A1-Senussi, ICC-01/li01/11-344-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I 52 (May 31, 2013) (decision on the admissibility
of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi).
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
41.
36 (Aug. 30,
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-274 OA, Appeals Chamber
2011).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
42.
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genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or
prosecution. 43 The ICC jurisprudence provides guidance as to what is
meant by "the case being investigated or prosecuted" as well as the
state's "unwillingness" or "inability" criteria. 4 4 The jurisprudence in
the context of admissibility proceedings shows that the ICC does not
usurp its power and in fact strives to promote the principle of positive
complementarity.
In the most recent commentary on conformity of the Constitution
of Ukraine with the Rome Statute, Professor M. Hnatovsky stresses
the erroneous reading of the principle of complementarity by the
Constitutional Court, which did not take into consideration that the
ICC jurisdiction would only be triggered if Ukraine did not fulfill its
international obligations to prosecute international crimes. 4 5
Further, he argues that "the principle of complementarity is not a
problem but, to the contrary, a guarantee against unlawful
interference of the ICC in the competence of national courts, and is
aimed at protecting the sovereignty of the State, rather than limiting
it."'4 6 Hence, by ratifying the Rome Statute, Ukraine will not deprive
its domestic courts of jurisdiction over international crimes. To the
contrary, it will provide them with necessary tools to prosecute these
crimes nationally, while at the same time offering the possibility to
turn to the ICC for assistance if the prosecution of such crimes is
impossible due to Ukraine's unwillingness or inability to do so.
Despite the criticism voiced by many academic commentators
and civil society organizations against the ruling of the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine, it still remains in force. 47 The question of the

43.
See id.
44.
See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AlSenussi, ICC-O1/l1-01/ll OA 4, Appeals Chamber (May 21, 2014); Prosecutor v. Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah A1-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Appeals Chamber
(July 24, 2014).
45.
M. Hnatovsky, 'Opinion on Conformity of the Constitution of Ukraine with
the Rome Statute of the ICC' (in Ukrainian), April 2014 (on file with author).
46.
See id.
47.

See A.

ZYUKINA, IHpo6Aemu immnememayt

Pumcbcoeo cmamymy 6 YicpaYei

(Problems of Implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine), in 60 AKTYAJIbHI
HIPOfifEMi JEPKABI4 I HPABA (ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND LAW) 419, 424 (2011); S.
Kivalov, Misicnapoase KpumiaZbHe npaocy6tA: 6i0 HbopH6ep3bKOeO siCbKOeOzO mpu6yHaczy oo
mixtcHapoaloeo KpuMiuambnooo cyay (International Criminal Justice: The Nuremberg
Military Tribunal by the International Criminal Court), in 1 AJIbMAHAX MDKHAPOJIHOirO
HIPABA (ALMANAC INTERNATIONAL LAW) 5, 18 (2009); Press Release, Coalition for the

International Criminal Court, Global Coalition Urges Ukraine to Join the ICC (Jul. 9,
2012)
[hereinafter
CICC
2012],
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Ukraine-URC-July2 l2-Press-release-Fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.ccU478-HNVM] (archived Feb. 13, 2016); Press Release,
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Global Coalition Urges Ukraine to Join
the ICC (Jul. 1, 2008), http://www.iccnow.org/documentsJUkraineURCPRJuly
2008en.pdf [https://perma.ccW2J2-BZVU] (archived Feb. 13, 2016); Press Release,
Amnesty International, Ukraine: Letter to New President Calls for Urgent Human
Rights
Reform
(Jan.
24,
2005)
[hereinafter
Amnesty
International],
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validity of the ruling has gained prominence in the context of the two
Ukrainian declarations under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute on
the ad hoc acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC. A number of
important questions surface. Does the ad hoc acceptance of ICC
jurisdiction by Ukraine overrule the decision of the Constitutional
Court? If the ICC chooses to authorize an investigation into the
alleged crimes committed in Ukraine, will it need to look into the
ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine? Should the current
government focus on completing the initiated amendment procedure
that will pave the way towards the ratification of the Rome Statute?
Alternatively, can the validity of the Constitutional Court be
challenged in light of the dubious reading of the ICC's principle of
complementarity?

III. TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE THROUGH
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE

First of all, it is necessary to consider the hierarchical
relationship between Ukrainian national law and international law.
Should there be a discrepancy between Ukrainian national legislation
and a particular international treaty, international law will only
apply if Ukraine chooses to implement necessary changes that would
eliminate such discrepancies. 48 Pursuant to Article 9 of the
Constitution of Ukraine, international agreements that are in force
and have been agreed to be binding by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
become part of the national legislation of Ukraine. 49 However, the
question of the relationship between national and international law is
yet unclear, as the constitutional provision remains silent as to
whether national legislation or international treaties should prevail.
This uncertainty seems to be resolved in lex specialis-the Law of
Ukraine On International Treaties, which states that duly ratified
international treaties have primacy over national legislation. 50 On
the subject of ratification, the law provides that international
agreements with respect to Ukraine's participation in international
organizations should be ratified. 5 1 The process of ratification entails
the adoption of a specific law on ratification that includes a full text of
the international treaty in question. 52 If the ratification of a
particular international treaty necessitates the adoption of new laws
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ukraine-letter-new-president-calls-urgenthuman-rights-reform [https://perma.cc/KM89-9WSF] (archived Feb. 13, 2016).
48.
See Koucmumnyitm YKparnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 9 (Ukr.).
49.
See id.
50.
3aKOH YKpaIHH 'flpo MixHdlapoaHi AoroBopH YIpa'/n' (Law of Ukraine on
International Treaties of Ukraine) adopted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 29 June
2004, art. 19 (2).
51.
See id., art. 9(2)(d).
52.
See id., art. 9(1).
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or amendments to existing laws, it is required that the draft law
accounting for such changes be submitted to the parliament along
53
with the law on ratification of that international treaty.
A reading of the constitutional law provision together with lex
specialis on international treaties presupposes amending the
Constitution of Ukraine's section on the exclusive competence of
Ukrainian national courts in order to remove the obstacle to ratifying
the Rome Statute as identified by the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine. However, one may also adopt a broader view and question
the validity of the Constitutional Court's ruling with respect to the
interpretation of the ICC's principle of complementarity and its
relationship to Ukrainian national courts. Having said that, the law
on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine does not provide a procedure
that would allow for reopening the case on the grounds of an alleged
wrongful interpretation of an international treaty, as such reopening
is only possible in light of the discovery of new facts that, although
had existed at the time the case was heard by the court, were not
subject to the proceedings. 54 Given that the Constitutional Court
undertook a detailed treatment of the principle of complementarity,
this would preclude the situation of reopening the case. Hence, the
only way forward towards ratification of the Rome Statute appears to
be amending the Constitution of Ukraine, which is a fairly complex
and burdensome procedure.
The constitutional amendment procedure may be initiated by the
President of Ukraine or by at least one third of all members of
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 55 Amendments to constitutional
provisions, apart from the provisions laid down in Chapter I (General
Foundations), Chapter III (Elections. Referendum), and Chapter XIII
(Amendments to the Constitutions of Ukraine), must be preliminarily
approved by a parliamentary majority and garner support of at least
two-thirds of all members of the parliament during the final
56
hearing.
Following the 2001 ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine,
all attempts to amend Article 124 of the Constitution in order to
accommodate the ICC within Ukraine's framework of the
administration of justice have been futile, 5 7 with very little
information available on the outcome of legislative initiatives made in
2008 and 2014. Amnesty International's appeal to the top Ukrainian

See id., art. 9(7).
53.
54.
See Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 6, art. 68.
55.
See KoHcmumyis YKpairnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 154 (Ukr.).
56.
See id., art. 155.
57.
E.g., VERKHOvNA RADA OF UKRAINE, http://wl.cl.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2
webproc4_1?pf3511=49833 [https://perma.cc/8E3P-C3ZC] (archived Feb. 29, 2016)
(stating that Law Draft No. 0072 on Ratification of the Rome Statute was recalled on
Feb. 24, 2014).
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officials urging them to undertake the necessary constitutional
amendment in order to "allow prompt ratification of the Rome
Statute," as well as the 2008 Coalition for the ICC (CICC) campaign,
were left largely unattended. 58 It does not come as a surprise that
some countries are reluctant to allow international courts to exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes committed on their territory and/or by
their nationals, fearing that this would lead to a loosening of their
grip on their independent handling of domestic affairs. As mentioned
elsewhere, amendment processes may be "resisted for fear of opening
a political Pandora's box." 59 However, contrary to popular belief, the
ICC is not interested in expanding its already heavy workload.
Rather it strives to promote the effective implementation of the Rome
Statute by States Parties that will enable them to adjudicate
international crimes in their national jurisdictions. 60 The ICC, as a
court of last resort, will only step in when national jurisdictions
cannot cope with the prosecution of international crimes and require
assistance of the Court.
The discussion on the necessity of ratifying the Rome Statute
was revived yet again in January 2015, on the fifteenth anniversary
since the Rome Statute was signed by Ukraine. The draft law on
amending Article 124 of the Constitution of Ukraine was submitted
by 155 parliamentarians on January 16, 2015, for further
consideration by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 6 1 The draft law
suggests introducing the following provision into the text of Article
124: "Ukraine may recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC on the
conditions stipulated by the Rome Statute of the ICC. '' 62 In the
explanatory note to the draft, the importance of ratification is
brought to the fore in light of the current unstable situation in
Ukraine:
[T]he Rome Statute of the ICC should be immediately ratified given a large
number of victims as a result of criminal acts committed by the highest
governmental officials, as well as given the investigation of crimes that are of
concern to the international community and, therefore, fall within the
63
jurisdiction of the ICC.

58.
See CICC 2012, supra note 47; Amnesty International, supra note 47.
59.
Duffy, supra note 19, at 7.
60.
SCHABAS, supra note 34, at 336.
61.
Draft Law, supra note 5.
62.
The wording is similar to the amendment introduced into the French
Constitution following the ruling of the Conseil Constitutionnel.See id.
63.
Hoscwttoean7bHa 3anucca 6o npoemy 3aKouy npo saecenaa 3Min o cmammi 124
Koncmumyqit Yicpafnu (uzodo eauama nooatceb PucbKOzo cmamymy) (Explanatory Note to
the Draft Law of Ukraine on Amending Article 124 of the Constitution of Ukraine (with
regard to the recognition of the Rome Statute), 16 January 2015.
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At the time of writing this Article, little information was
available on the status of the draft law on the website of the
parliament, apart from a brief note stating that the draft is suggested
to be included on the agenda of the parliamentary hearing on
December 9, 2015, following consultations on the law draft in
64
parliamentary committees.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the Rome Statute
does not have retroactive effect, which means that the ICC could only
potentially exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed on
the territory of Ukraine after the entry into force of the Rome Statute,
unless Ukraine makes a declaration under Article 12 (3) and accepts
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court before the Rome Statute's entry
into force. 6 5 As stated above, Ukraine has already accepted the ad hoc
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the alleged crimes against
humanity committed during the Maydan protests in the period
between November 21, 2013, and February 22, 2014,66 as well as
with respect to the alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea from February 20, 2014,
onwards.67

The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine expressed
skepticism with respect to the ratification of the Rome Statute by
turning to the example of Georgia, a signatory to the Rome Statute
that unsuccessfully sought to have the alleged war crimes committed
during the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict be prosecuted by the ICC. 68
Since the beginning of the preliminary investigation in Georgia, there

64.
For status updates on this particular law draft, see VERKHOVNA RADA OF
UKRAINE, http://wl.cl.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_l?pf3511=53621 [https://perma.
(archived Feb. 13, 2016); VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE,
cc/MB5J-G7PX]
http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/awt/show/6060.html [https:Hlperma.cc/Q2WX-RNTK]
(archived Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that according to the official schedule of parliamentary
hearings, the law draft has not been included on the agenda yet).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
65.
Declaration of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the ICC on the recognition of
66.
the jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine over crimes against humanity, committed by
senior officials of the state, which led to extremely grave consequences and mass
murder of Ukrainian nationals during peaceful protests within the period 21 November
2013-22 February 2014 signed by the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Oleksandr Turchynov, Case No 790-VII, 25 February 2014 [hereinafter Declaration I].
Declaration of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the ICC on the recognition of
67.
the jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine over crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed by senior officials of the Russian Federation and leaders of the Russian
Federation and leaders of terrorist organizations "DNR" and "LNR," which led to
extremely grave consequences and mass murder of Ukrainian nationals signed by the
Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine V. Groysman, No 145-VIII, 4 February
2015 [hereinafter Declaration II].

68.

The Council of the NationalSecurity and Defence Does Not Advise to Hurry

Up with Ratification of the Rome Statute, INTERFAX NEWS (Feb. 2, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/VMA7-D523]
http://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/political/248115.html
(archived Feb. 13, 2016).
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had been very scarce public information on the progress of the
investigation by the ICC. 69 Unexpectedly, on October 13, 2015, which
is seven years since the conflict took place, the ICC Prosecutor finally
decided to seek the Pre-Trial's Chamber authorization to proceed
with an investigation. 70 On the one hand, the Prosecutor's decision is
hailed as the new chapter in the history of the Court; 7 1 however, on
the other hand, the decision is also a testament to the ICC
Prosecutor's inefficiency and short-sighted strategy, as the
momentum to move forward with the case seems to have been lost a
long time ago. As one commentator suggests, by going forward with
the situation in Georgia, the Prosecutor signals that other sensitive
cases under the preliminary examination, such as Ukraine, Palestine
72
and Afghanistan, are "not likely to be opened anytime soon."
Four weeks later, on November 12, 2015, the ICC Prosecutor
issued its preliminary examination report, in which it informs of its
decision not to act on the first declaration lodged by Ukraine with
respect to the alleged crimes against humanity during the 2014
Maydan protests. 73 The Article will further address substantive law
issues linked to the two declarations on the ad hoc jurisdiction
acceptance and will argue that the ICC Prosecutor got it wrong when
she decided not to move forward with the first declaration, as the
preconditions for seeking the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber
appear to be in place.

IV. DECLARATION

ACCEPTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC FOR

ALLEGED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DURING THE MAYDAN PROTESTS

(DECLARATION I)

The refusal of the former President of Ukraine Viktor
Yanukovych to sign the EU association agreement sparked
nationwide protests in Ukraine in favor of closer ties with the

69.
For more information on the preliminary examination of the situation in
Georgia, see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Georgia, https://www.icccpi.int/en menus/iccsituations%2and%2casessituations/ICC-1-15Pages/default.as
px [https://perma.cc/9NLP-Z79H]
(archived Feb. 13, 2016) (containing more
information on the preliminary examination of the situation in Georgia).
70.
Corrected version of Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant
to article 15, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-01/15-4-Corr, Oct. 16, 2015.
News Release, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ICC
71.
Considers Georgia Investigation-Key Facts and Reaction (Oct. 14 2015),
https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/icc-considers-georgia-investigationkey-facts/ [https://perma.cc/Q34C-2TJT] (archived Feb. 13, 2016).
72.
Alex Whiting, The Significant Firsts of an ICC Investigation in Georgia,
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2015, 9:38 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26817/icc.
investigation-georgia/ [https://perma.cc/HJJ2-LJED] (archived Feb. 15, 2016).
73.
Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
(Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter OTP report].
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European Union. 74 Two months into the pro-EU demonstrations, the
government unleashed violence against peaceful protesters that
resulted in mass killings of and injuries to protesters who took to the
streets to oppose government policies. 75 Despite Yanukovych's
attempts to broker a compromise deal with the opposition leaders and
agree on the early presidential elections in December 2014, the
protestors rejected the deal and demanded his resignation with
immediate effect.76
Claiming that he feared for his life, Yanukovych fled Ukraine to
neighboring Russia, leaving the country without a president. 7 7 On
February 22, 2014, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the
Resolution "On Self-Withdrawal of the President of Ukraine From
Performing His Constitutional Duties," which confirmed that
Yanukovych withdrew from performing his constitutional duties and
found his actions to have threatened the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the protection of human rights and
freedoms. 78 The Parliament bestowed presidential duties upon the
Chairperson of the Parliament of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov,
who acted as interim President until the election of Petro Poroshenko
79
as the new President of Ukraine.
On February 25, 2014, while the interim President still held
office, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declared that it accepted the
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to crimes against humanity
allegedly committed by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, on
orders of senior government officials that authorized the unleashing
of violence against peaceful protesters.8 0 In his capacity as ex officio
Head of State, Oleksandr Turchynov signed the declaration. 8 1 The

See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, UKRAINE: TIMELINE OF EVENTS, http:I/
74.
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-roomi/20140203STO34645/Ukraine-timeline-ofevents [https://perma.cc/UBV5-VA6K] (archived Feb. 15, 2016).

75.
76.
77.

See id.
See id.
See id.

78.

fIpo

cauoycyeenns

Hpe3uaenma Ykparnu

nosnoaafCeHb ma npu3HatenNA noaepeoeux au6opie

6id

euronafni

Koucmumyqiilux

Hpe3udenma Ykparuu [Resolution of

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 'On Self-Withdrawal of the President of Ukraine from
Performing His Constitutional Duties and Scheduling Early Elections of the President
of Ukraine'] (Feb. 22, 2014).
79.
See KoncmumyZis YKparuu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 112 (Ukr.)
(explaining what procedure follows in the event of early termination of the presidential
duties). Petro Poroshenko was elected as a new President of Ukraine in a landmark
presidential election on 25 May 2014. Many world leaders, including the U.S. President
Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Francois
Hollande, recognized the importance of elections as a way out of the political crisis and
congratulated Petro Poroshenko on winning the election.
80.
See Declaration I, supra note 66 (recognizing jurisdiction for the purpose of
having senior officials of Ukraine face criminal liability).
See id. (containing Oleksandr Turchynov's electronic signature at the end
81.
of the document).
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declaration submits that Ukrainian law enforcement agencies
unlawfully used physical force and weapons against the participants
of peaceful demonstrations in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, having
acted on orders of Ukrainian senior officials, which resulted in the
killing of over one hundred nationals of Ukraine and other states;
serious injuries inflicted upon more than 2,000 persons (500 persons
in serious condition), torture, abductions, enforced disappearances,
unlawful deprivation of liberty, and inflicting damage on the
82
protesters' property.
Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute allows for a state that is not a
party to the Statute to accept jurisdiction of the Court by lodging a
declaration with the registrar of the Court. 83 The statutory provision
on the acceptance of jurisdiction is a window of opportunity for a nonState Party to the Rome Statute to opt for the jurisdiction of the
Court. The jurisdiction triggered by the acceptance of a non-State
Party may be exercised retroactively-that is, in relation to crimes
that have already been committed.8 4 However, if a state becomes a
party to the Rome Statute, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction
with respect to the crimes committed after the entry into force of the
Statute. This means that even if Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted
the required constitutional amendment to allow for the jurisdiction of
the Court and ratified the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court
would only apply from the date of the Statute's entry into force.
Hence, lodging a declaration under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute
was the only available venue to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the crimes that have already been committed during
the Maydan protests (or commonly known in Ukraine as the
"Revolution of Dignity").
Although Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the declaration
accepting the ICC jurisdiction in February 2014, it was not until midApril that the declaration was officially lodged with the Registrar of
the ICC. 8 5 In its succinct press release, the ICC acknowledged that
the declaration was relayed to its Office of the Prosecutor for further
consideration.8 6 The statement also made clear that the acceptance of

82.
Id.
83.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3).
84.
See id. art. 11(2) (stating that it may apply retroactively if a declaration is
made under article 12(3)); see also Kevin Jon Heller, Yes, Palestine Could Accept the
ICC's Jurisdiction Retroactively, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 29, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/
[http://perma.
2012/1l/29/yes-palestine.could-accept-the-iccs-jurisdiction-retroactively/
cc/JM7W-V3V4] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
See Press Release, ICC, Ukraine Accepts the ICC Jurisdiction over Alleged
85.
Crimes Committed Between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014, ICC-CPI201440417-PR997 (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en.menus/icc/press%20and%
20medialpress%/o20releases/Pages/pr997.aspx
[http://perma.cc/ETH3-7ZVU] (archived
Jan. 24, 2016).
86.
Id.
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the ICC's jurisdiction did not automatically trigger an investigation,
as it was within the discretion of the ICC prosecutor to decide
whether or not to request the Pre-Trial Chamber's authorization of an
8 7
investigation.
Ukraine's acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by way of submitting an
Article 12 (3) declaration is not a unique occurrence in the history of
the ICC. Similar declarations were previously lodged by Ivory Coast
and Palestine. The Republic of Ivory Coast, which is not a State Party
to the Rome Statute, initially lodged a declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court for the crimes committed on its territory
since September 19, 2002.88 Ironically, the declaration was signed by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamadou Bamba acting on behalf of
the government of the former President Laurent Gbagbo. The latter
was later charged himself with crimes against humanity committed
in the midst of the post-election chaos and currently stands trial
before the ICC. 89 In December 2010, a newly elected President and
former rival of Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane Ouattara, confirmed "the
continuing validity of the 2003 Declaration" and, in a letter to the
ICC, declared that it was "reasonable to believe that crimes falling
under the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed" during the
serious post-election crisis in October-November 2010.90
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) lodged its declaration
on the acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction on January 21, 2009, "for
the purpose of identifying, prosecuting, and judging the authors and
accomplices of crimes committed in the territory of Palestine since 1
July 2002."91 However, the then ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo
decided not to proceed with the investigation in light of Palestine's

Id.
87.
Mamadou Bamba, Dclaration de Reconnaissance de la Comp6tence de la
88.
Cour Pdnale Internationale [Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the ICC] (Apr.
18, 2003), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FF9939C2-8E97-4463934C-BC8F351BA013/279779/ICDEl.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [perma.ccVC66ESSS] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Government of former President Gbagbo).
89.
See generally The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles B16 Goud6,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/iccO211/rela
(archived
[perma.cc/8X22-7LPX]
ted%20cases/ICC-02_11-01_15/Pages/default.aspx
Jan. 24, 2016).
Letter from President Alassane Ouattara, Confirmation de la Ddclaration
90.
de Reconnaissance (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB(archived
[perma.cc/X4DL-2AXC]
7A72-4005-A209-C14BA374804F/O/ReconCPI.pdf
Jan. 24, 2016) (confirming the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC).
See Ali Khashan, Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the
91.
International Criminal Court (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
7CFB4BO1-OB7E-4590-A8A8-7863E516FOA3/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration
7.pdf [http://perma.cc/B47G-TN2A] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (recognizing the
jurisdiction of the ICC by the Minister of Justice for the Government of Palestine).
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92
Most
contentious statehood status under international law.
recently, Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute and at the same time
lodged a new declaration accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC
over the crimes committed between June 13, 2014, and the Rome
Statute's entry into force. 9 3 Following in Palestine's footsteps, it
would be ideal if Ukraine not only submitted declarations accepting
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC but also committed itself to the
ratification of the Rome Statute.
Below the Article provides an overview of legal challenges
connected to Ukraine's declaration, in particular the contested
validity of the declaration, identification of key suspects of the alleged
crimes against humanity, and the narrow scope of the temporal
jurisdiction, which was subsequently revisited by the new declaration
lodged by Ukraine.

A. Problems Linked to Ukraine'sDeclarationI
1. Is the Declaration Duly Signed?
A number of legal problems are associated with Ukraine's
declaration on the acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction. First of all, the
declaration that garnered support of a parliamentary majority was
signed by Oleksandr Turchynov, both in his capacity as the
Chairperson of the Parliament and ex officio Head of State-a role
that the Chairperson of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine assumes if the
President is unable to perform his constitutional duties. 94 When the
President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country and
abandoned his presidential post, the Chairperson of Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, assumed presidential duties. In his
capacity as ex officio Head of State, he signed the declaration

See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement by ICC General Prosecutor
92.
Abnegating Competence for Crimes Committed in Palestine, VOLTAIRE
NETWORK (Apr. 3, 2012) (refraining from assessing whether Palestine qualifies
as a state for the purpose of acceding to the Rome Statute, and left the
question of legal determination to the UN relevant authorities or the ASP).
93.
See Mahmoud Abbas, Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (Dec. 31, 2014), https:l/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/
press/PalestineA_12-3.pdf [perma.cc/2A6D-QJHW] (archived Jan. 24, 2016); see also
Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary
Examination of the Situation in Palestine, ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083 (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en~menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr
1083.aspx [perma.cc/G29R-6N5Z] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (announcing the opening of
a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine in order to establish whether
the Rome Statute criteria for opening an investigation are met under article 53(1) of
the Rome Statute).
94.
See KoucmumyyiR Yeparfu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 112 (Ukr.) (stating
that in the event of an early termination of the president, the powers of the president
are vested in the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).
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accepting the ad hoe jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine. 95 What has
been questioned in the media and numerous international law blogs
is whether the Chairperson of the Parliament had the constitutional
right to sign the declaration in the capacity of ex officio Head of State,
given the glaring absence of self-withdrawal as a ground for
termination of presidential duties as per the Constitution of Ukraine.
Pursuant to Article 108 of the Constitution, the duties of the
President may be terminated before the expiry of his/her term in
office on the grounds of: (1) resignation, (2) inability to perform
his/her duties for health reasons, (3) removal from office by means of
the impeachment procedure, and (4) death. 9 6 In the case of
resignation, the president must personally tender his resignation at a
parliamentary hearing. 97 As former President Yanukovych neither
tendered his resignation nor was removed from office through the
impeachment procedure, the validity of the declaration signed by the
98
Chairperson of the Parliament has been subject to discussion.
At first sight, a narrow textual reading of the constitutional
provisions renders questionable the legality of the parliamentary
decision on bestowing presidential duties on the Chairperson of
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the face of Yanukovych's selfwithdrawal. However, a broader teleological reading of the
Constitution, in light of its democratic principles and foundations,
would render the presidential mandate illegitimate if the President
breached the oath he had undertaken when assuming his office and is
suspected of directing crimes against humanity against his country's
own nationals. The failure to serve for the good of his country and the
dereliction of duty in protecting the rights and freedoms of its citizen
must effectively be viewed as being incompatible with the
presidential mandate.
community
opposes
the
the
international
Although
unconstitutional and forceful change of a democratically elected
government, it appears that in recent years the distinction has been
made between "legitimate popular uprisings against authoritarian
rulers" and "unconstitutional changes of government." 99 In the

95.
See Declaration I, supra note 66 (containing Oleksandr Turchynov's
electronic signature at the end of the document).
KoHcmumy~iR YKpaYnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 108 (Ukr.).
96.
97.
Id art. 109.

98.

See News of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych Press Conference in Rostov 11-03-

14, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2014), https:f/www.youtube.com/watch?v-uR8PqVYd84
[https://perma.cc/8GJ6-99CS] (archived Feb. 15, 2016) (depicting the press conference
on March 11, 2014 in Rostov-on-Don, Russia where Yanukovych gave an official press
conference during which he ascertained that he was a legitimate president of Ukraine
after he fled Ukraine).

99.

See EUR. PARL., Actions of the African Union Against Coups D16tat, 2 (Mar.

2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/551307/EPRSATA
(2015)551307EN.pdf [perma.cc/8HXU.6UXC] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (detailing the
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context of the Egyptian uprising against former President Hosni
Mubarak's regime and other uprisings in North Africa, the African
Union panel proposed a number of criteria that would render the
unconstitutional change of a government (UCG) legitimate, such as
(a) the descent of the government into total authoritarianism to the
point of forfeiting its legitimacy, (b) the absence or total
ineffectiveness of constitutional processes for effecting change of
government, (c) the popularity of the uprisings in the sense of
attracting a significant portion of the population and involving people
from all walks of life and ideological persuasions, (d) the absence of
involvement of the military in removing the government, and (e) the
peacefulness of the popular protests. 10 0 The proposed criteria reflect
the latest developments in the international arena when
authoritarian governments that show gross disregard for the human
rights of its citizens are destined to crumble under pressure. The
legitimacy of UCG is also tested through governmental recognition by
another state(s), which entails that "the recognizing state(s) will deal
with the government as the governing authority of the state and
accept the usual legal consequences of such status." 10 1 As Thomas
Franck points out, while not yet encapsulated in law, but rapidly
becoming a norm within the international system, the right to govern
is contingent on a government having met both the democratic
entitlement of the governed as well as the standards of the
community of states. 10 2 The legitimacy of a government is closely
linked to the rite of recognition. This act of recognition by a foreign
government endows a new regime with a range of entitlements and
duties that are concomitant with sovereignty and will in turn bestow
upon a de facto regime the status of "official government. ' 10 3 When a
new regime is recognized as validly representing the state in its
foreign relations, it can avail itself of rights accorded to sovereigns
under international law, of which the lawful negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements form an indispensable part. 104
In the present case, President Yanukovych left Ukraine in the
absence of a coup d'6tat or other similar undemocratic attempt at
African Union's approach that distinguishes between these two different efforts to
change the government).
100.
Final Report of the African Union High-Level Panel for Egypt, AFRICAN
UNION PEACE & SECURITY, June 17, 2014, § 83, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/finalreport-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt#sthash.odJRzlx8.dpuf [perma.cc/
LUT9-H7SX] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
101.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 455 (6th ed. 2008); Jonte van
Essen, De Facto Regimes in InternationalLaw, 28 UTRECHT J. INT'L & EUR. L. 31, 40
(2012).
102.
T. M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 26 (G.H Fox and B. R. Roth eds., 2000).
103.
See T. M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705, 726 (1988); van Essen, supranote 101, at 32-39.
104.
See S. D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States
and Government, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 545-46 (1999).
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ousting him from his post. Instead, his departure was triggered by
public protests calling for his resignation in the face of the waning
legitimacy of his presidential mandate. 10 5 The change of the
Ukrainian government was widely accepted internationally as an
expression of the Ukrainian people's right to demand democratic
change. 10 6 In light of this, the position of the author of this Article is
that the new government was legitimately instituted, and therefore
the chairperson of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in his capacity as ex
officio Head of State was entitled to submit a binding declaration to
the ICC, which subjects Ukraine to the jurisdiction of the Court.
On a separate note, it still remains unclear why Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine did not choose a more definite path towards the removal of
Viktor Yanukovych from his office by means of the impeachment
procedure. Although the procedure itself is fairly complicated and
time-consuming, it was undoubtedly worth pursuing and would have
dispelled any doubts regarding the legal capacity of the ex officio
Head of the State to act on behalf of the state. Pursuant to Article 111
of the Constitution of Ukraine, the impeachment procedure is
initiated by a parliamentary majority if the President of Ukraine is
suspected of committing treason or another crime. 10 7 As a result, the
parliament of Ukraine should establish an ad hoc temporary
investigative commission to conduct an investigation into the crimes
allegedly committed by the President. 10 8 The decision on indicting
the President of Ukraine should be adopted by two-thirds of a
parliamentary majority, following a special plenary session, in which
the findings of the investigative commission are heard. 10 9 The very
decision on the removal of the President of Ukraine from office
through the impeachment procedure should be adopted by at least
three-fourths of the members of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and
should be accompanied by both a ruling by the Constitutional Court
of Ukraine that states that the impeachment procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Ukraine that the crimes on the basis
of which the President is indicted contain the legal elements of state
110
treason or another crime.

105.
See UKRAINE: TIMELINE OF EVENTS, supra note 74 (providing an overview
of major events from the Orange Revolution until present).
106.
See Press Release, Ukraine Accepts ICC Jurisdiction, supra note 85.
107.
See Koncmumyzji YKpabnu (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 111 (Ukr.)
(providing for impeachment procedure of the President of Ukraine).
108.
See id. (stating that the commission should be composed of a special
prosecutor and special investigators).
109.
See id.
110.
See id.
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2. Naming of Suspects
The first declaration implicates a number of senior Ukrainian
officials-including, among others, the former President of Ukraine
Viktor Yanykovych, the former General Prosecutor of Ukraine Viktor
Pshonka, and the former Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
1 11
Vitaliy Zakharchenko-in the commission of the alleged crimes.
There is no official information available about the whereabouts of
the suspects who were named in the declaration, although it is widely
reported in the media that they have all fled to and currently reside
in Russia. 112 However, in naming a list of suspects, Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine exceeded its competence, as it is within discretion of the
ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation upon the authorization
from the Pre-Trial Chamber and identify suspect(s) on the basis of
113
the available evidence.
3. Temporal Jurisdiction
The ratione temporis jurisdiction, as outlined in the first
declaration, covers the period from November 30, 2013, to February
22, 2014.114 This entails that the ICC Prosecutor, acting on the
declaration, is entitled to investigate the crimes within given time
framework. Although the declaration was lodged shortly after the
annexation of the autonomous republic of Crimea by the Russian
Federation in March 2015 and at the backdrop of the emerging
conflict in eastern Ukraine, its temporal scope is only limited to the
crimes committed during the Maydan protests. 115 With the escalation
of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and widely reported incidents of

See Declaration I, supra note 66 (appealing to the ICC to bring senior
111.
Ukrainian officials to justice).
112.
It is reported that all suspects were granted Russian citizenship and
currently reside on the territory of Russia. There have been speculations that Viktor
Pshonka attempted to leave Russia for Kazakhstan. See E. Borovskaya, Ft}e oau menepb:
KaK o6ycmpoUucb 6 Poccuu 6ewcaswueyKpauscKue 4Uuosuuu [Where are they? How deposed

Ukrainian officials settled in Russia], OPENRUSSIA BLOG (Feb. 24, 2015),
https:/Iopenrussia.orglpost/view/29201 [perma.cc/T9TG-XCZL] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
Russian and Ukrainian media report that the Russian President Vladimir Putin
appointed Vitaliy Zakharchenko as an expert member of the parliamentary committee
that deals with property rights, in particular the protection of Russian investors'
property rights abroad, See 3,c-eAasa MB,4 Ykpaunbz 3axapteuKo cma 9Kcnepmom no
ussecmuquSM [Former Minister of Interior Affairs Became an Expert on Investment],
IZVESTIA NEWS (Mar. 25 2015), http:/izvestia.rulnews/584507 [perma.ccIN47G-DX69]
(archived Jan. 24, 2016).
113.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53.
114.
See Declaration I, supra note 66 (stating that during the period of peaceful
protests mass murder of Ukrainian nationals took place).
115.
See id.
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war crimes, the importance of expanding the scope of the existing
declaration or lodging a new one was broadly debated. 116
B. The ICC Prosecutor'sDecision Not to Act on DeclarationI as a
Missed Opportunity
At the time of writing this Article, which was before the decision
117
of the ICC Prosecutor not to act on the declaration became public,
the author argued that, in deciding whether to initiate an
investigation into the alleged crimes against humanity, the
Prosecutor would have to grapple with a number of important legal
issues, such as the validity of the acceptance of the ICC's ad hoc
jurisdiction by the Ukrainian interim government and the important
jurisdictional issue as to whether the OTP may proceed with an
investigation of the alleged crimes, notwithstanding the earlier ruling
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on nonconformity of the ICC's
principle of complementarity with the Constitution of Ukraine. As to
the question of the validity of the declaration, it is not clear whether
such an assessment is supposed to be carried out by the ICC
Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber. It appears that until now the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has paid attention to whether the person who
signed the declaration on behalf of the state had the authority to do
so. 118 Since the ICC Prosecutor decided not to seek the authorization
of an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber on the basis that the
alleged crimes did not meet the threshold of crimes against
humanity, 119 the judges did not have the possibility to address such
important issues as the validity of the declaration and the existence
of the jurisdictional impediment imposed by the Constitutional Court
of Ukraine. However, it is not even certain that if the case had been
brought before the Pre-Trial Chamber, the ICC judges would have
chosen to do so. Given the ICC's lack of competence to demand the
amendment of national constitutions or, more broadly, interfere with
national constitutional matters, the Pre-Trial Chamber might have
chosen to disregard constitutional law issues altogether and narrowly

116.
See Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
November 2014, at 6, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crimeal114
ForUpload.pdf
[perma.cc/JKK6-UFAJ]
(archived Jan. 24,
2016) (providing
recommendations to the United Nations how to address the human rights abuses in
Crimea).
117.
See OTP report, supra note 73,
89-101 (providing the legal analysis of
Maydan events).
118.
See Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire,
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14, § 14
(Oct. 3, 2011) (stating that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former President had
the authority to sign a declaration on behalf of Cote d'Ivoire).
119.
See OTP Report, supra note 73,
101.
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focus on whether a basis exists for initiating an investigation. It is not
ruled out that the situation will eventually be brought before the PreTrial Chamber, as the assessment of widespread or systematic nature
of the attack associated with the Maydan crimes may be reconsidered
120
in the future in light of the new facts.
In deciding whether a "reasonable basis" exists for initiating an
investigation, the ICC Prosecutor acted within the ICC's statutory
framework, considering whether (a) the information available to the
Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; (b) the
case is or would be inadmissible under Article 17 of the Statute; and
(c) taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of
justice, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 121 It is worth
mentioning that the reasonable basis standard is the lowest
evidentiary threshold that has to be proved by the Prosecutor in order
for the judges to be convinced of making a decision on the initiation of
an investigation into the specific situation. This means that the
information available to the Prosecutor, which is being served to the
Pre-Trial Chamber, does not have be "comprehensive" or "conclusive"
of the alleged crimes at the preliminary stage. 12 2 In other words, at
the preliminary stage, it is only necessary for the Pre-Trial Chamber
to arrive at the conclusion that "a sensible or reasonable justification
for a belief' that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have
123
been committed exists.
In the subsequent sections of the Article, the author will deal
with the three elements of the required test for the initiation of an
investigation into the situation in Ukraine, arguing that there exists
the basis for the initiation of the investigation within the meaning of
Article 53(l)(a) of the Rome Statute. The author further claims that
by taking an overly narrow approach to the interpretation of crimes
against humanity and deciding not to proceed with the situation, the
ICC Prosecutor missed the bigger picture and disregarded the
interests of justice.

120.
See id. (noting that serious human rights did occur and the evaluation of
those events may be reconsidered in light of new facts or information).
121.
Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 53(1)(a)-(c).
See Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 24..
122.
123.
See Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, § 27-35 (Mar. 31, 2010).
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1. Have the Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the ICC Been
Committed?
The first declaration submitted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
alleges that crimes against humanity were committed during the
crackdown on peaceful protesters by the Ukrainian law enforcement
12 4
agencies that acted on orders from senior governmental officials.
Among the crimes listed in the declaration are killings, infliction of
serious bodily harm, beatings, torture, abductions and enforced
disappearances, unlawful deprivation of liberty, forcible transfer for
the purposes of torture and murder, persecution on political grounds,
and unlawful damage of demonstrators' property. 125
The violence against peaceful protesters, mainly young
university students, was unleashed by a special riot police unit,
commonly known as "Berkut," in late November 2013, with the
intention to disperse protesters. 126 There are abundant video
materials, which were also posted on YouTube, as well as recorded
witness testimonies that confirm numerous instances of police officers
and pro-government group of civilians commonly known as "titushky"
(anti-Maydan
activists)
using
excessive
force
against
demonstrators. 12 7 The violence continued to escalate in December
2013 with reported casualties on both sides, and it spiralled out of
control with the adoption of a controversial law on January 16, 2014,
that substantially limited the right to gatherings and peaceful
demonstrations. 12 8 During the violent clashes between February 18
and 20, the death toll of protesters almost reached one hundred, most
29
of them being killed by snipers from rooftops in central Kyiv. 1
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC encompasses crimes
against humanity that involve the commission of any acts listed in

124.
125.

See Declaration I, supra note 66.
See id.

126.

See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Apr. 15, 2014,

127.

56.

See id.; see also TSN, Heaven's Hundred: The Winter That Changed Us,

YoUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6XQYnTcg28
perma.ccIN5LB-FE56] (archived Feb. 15, 2016).
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See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, supra note 126,
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Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack. 130 It follows from the definition that crimes against humanity,
unlike crimes under domestic law, have to be committed in a specific
context, which translates into the following contextual elements: (1)
an attack directed against any civilian population, (2) a state or
organizational policy, (3) an attack of a widespread or a systematic
nature, (4) the existence of a nexus between the individual act and
the attack, and (5) knowledge of the attack. 13 1 At the stage of the
authorization of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber has neither
to address the knowledge requirement linked to the contextual
elements nor the mental element for underlying acts of crimes
against humanity, as these constitutive elements should be
determined at a later stage of proceedings, once individual suspects
132
have been identified.
The "attack" refers to a course of conduct carried out against the
civilian population that involves multiple commission of underlying
1 33
acts of crimes against humanity enumerated in the Rome Statute.
In this regard, the civilian population must have been the primary
rather than an incidental target of the attack. The materials with
respect to the Maydan protests, which were made public by the
Prosecutor General's Office in Ukraine, show that a number of violent
attacks were launched by Ukrainian riot police units, acting on orders
from senior Ukrainian officials, against demonstrators who took to
the streets to express their dissatisfaction with government
policies. 134 In its preliminary report, the ICC Prosecutor
acknowledged that during the three months of demonstrations,
protesters and other individuals were killed as well as subjected to illtreatment, including torture and other inhumane acts, by members of
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and pro-government group of
civilians commonly known "titushky."135 The report further continues
that individuals were targeted on the basis of their opposition to the
13 6
former government of beleaguered President Viktor Yanukovych.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
130.
See id.; see also Elements of Crimes, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
131.
2011, art. 7.
See Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 29.
132.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
133.
134.
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ual [hereinafter PGO]
(providing an overview of the registration of criminal proceedings that involve the
commission of crimes committed during the Revolution of Dignity and the results of
investigation).
90 (defining 'titushky' as "proSee OTP Report, supra note 73,
135.
government group of civilians ... who coordinated with, and provided support to, law
enforcement during public order operations.").
136.
See id.
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This led the ICC Prosecutor to conclude that the violent acts against
protesters unleashed by Ukrainian security forces and "titushky"
satisfy the requirement of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which
37
requires the attack to be directed against a civilian population.1
As stated above, it is also necessary to prove that the attack was
committed "pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational
policy," which means "the state or organization actively promotes or
encourages attack against a civilian population."'138 The adoption of
Law No. 712-VII came into force on January 22, 2014, commonly
known as "dictatorship" or "draconian" laws, and is reflective of a
"state policy" on the part of the former Ukrainian government, which
imposed restrictions upon the right to peaceful demonstrations by
introducing harsh penalties and fines for crimes and acts associated
139
with the organization and participation in demonstrations.
Likewise, the absence of any information on sanctioning the unlawful
use of excessive force by the Ukrainian riot police also indicates that
the former government authorized the use of force against
demonstrators, condoned the behavior of police units, and attempted
to shield those responsible for using excessive force against
demonstrators. With respect to the policy requirement required for
crimes against humanity, the ICC Prosecutor was able to infer the
existence of a state policy to attack the civilian population during the
protests from a number of factual circumstances, among others,
"coordination of, and cooperation with, anti-Maydan citizen
volunteers," the "consistent failure of state authorities to take any
meaningful of effective action to prevent the repetition of incidents of
violence," "the apparent efforts to conceal or cover the alleged
crimes." 140 In light of these events and at the backdrop of the overall
political situation, the Prosecutor concluded that the violent acts of
security forces and titushky, which were aimed at quelling the
protests, were carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state
policy.141

One of the contextual elements of crimes against humanity,
which proved to be decisive in the Prosecutor's decision not to proceed
further with the situation, is the widespread or systematic nature of
the attack. The ICC jurisprudence is consistent with the developed
practice of the ad hoc tribunals that defines "widespread" through
"the large scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted
persons" and "systematic" through "the organized nature of the acts

137.

See id., $ 91.

138,
139.
140.
141.

Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 42.
See Law on Introducing Changes, supra note 128.
OTP Report, supra note 73, 93.
See id.
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142
of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence."
However, one does not have to prove both characteristics of the
attack, as they are disjunctive and not cumulative terms.
At the outset, the Prosecutor dismissed the widespread nature of
the attack, noting that "the alleged attack was limited in its intensity
and geographic scope". 14 3 The Prosecutor referred to a number of
factual circumstances in support of her conclusion, stating that "the
alleged crimes were committed almost exclusively in the context of a
limited number of clashes and confrontations between security forces
and protesters" during the three-month period, and "the majority of
the alleged crimes occurred in a limited geographic area within the
144
The
city of Kyiv . . . particularly in and around Maydan."'
Prosecutor also looked at the number of persons who were killed and
injured during the protests and concluded that the cumulative effect
of the killing of at least seventy-five civilians and the injury of 700
protesters rendered it questionable the existence of the widespread
145
The Prosecutor's
nature of the alleged crimes against humanity.
not surprising,
is
decision to rule out the widespread requirement
area and
limited
geographically
in
a
given that the attacks took place
in
comparison
narrower
much
given the number of victims, which is
to similar situations of violence that took place in peacetime in Kenya
been authorized for an
and Ivory Coast that have already
46
Chambers.1
ICC
the
investigation by
Following the evaluation of the widespread characteristic of the
attack, the Prosecutor examined whether the evidence supported the
conclusion of the systematic nature of the attack. She concluded that

Pre-Trial Chamber II, Kenya, supra note 123, §§ 95-96; Prosecutor v.
142.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/05-01/08-424, § 83 (June 15, 2009); Prosecutor v. DragoIjub Kunarac, IT-96-23& IT96-23/1-A, § 94 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blagkid ,IT-95-14-A, § 101 (July
29, 2004).
OTP Report, supranote 73, 96.
143.
Id.
144.
See id., 97 (concluding that some injuries were far less serious in nature
145.
and, therefore, did not constitute underlying acts of crimes against humanity).
See Pre-Trial Chamber II, Kenya, supra note 123, § 131 (when authorizing
146.
the investigation in the situation in Kenya, the judges confirmed the widespread
nature of the attack against civilians in light of the reports that 1,133 to 1,220 were
killed, about 3,561 people were injured and up to 350,000 persons were displaced in the
period between 27 December 2007 and 28 February 2008); Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory
Coast, supra note 118, §§ 102-05 (discussing the situation in Ivory Coast, the ICC
referred to the HRW's and Al's reports that accounted for many hundreds of civilians
who were killed, confirming the widespread and systematic nature of the attack); see
also Death Toll in Ivorian Post-Election Violence Surpassed 1,000, UN NEWS CENTRE,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/
2011,
26,
May
story.asp?NewsID=38522#.VcDGJvOqpBc [perma.cc/LVH4-E9HS] (archived Jan. 24,
2016) (showing that more than 1,000 people were killed in the 2011 post-election
crisis).
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the systematic dimension of crimes against humanity was missing,
given that the alleged crimes did "not necessarily appear to have been
carried out in a consistent, organized manner or on a regular or
continual basis." 14 7 The report lists a few examples in support of the
conclusion, emphasizing that "the alleged crimes occurred in an
infrequent and often more reactive manner, determined by the
the
developed
during
as
events
circumstances
different
demonstrations." 148 Despite acknowledging the unjustified and
disproportionate nature of the attack against protesters, the
Prosecutor nevertheless concluded that the alleged acts fall short of
meeting the systematic requirement of crimes against humanity,
since they were "aimed to limit the protests rather than being part of
a deliberate, coordinated plan of violence methodically carried out
against the protest movement" 149 and appear to have "occurred only
1 50
sporadically, in limited instances."
The author disagrees with the Prosecutor's evaluation of the
systematic nature of the attack and argues that, despite the
disjunctive test of "widespread" or "systematic" attack in
international criminal law, there seems to be an underlying
presumption that both elements have to be present. It has never
occurred in the practice of international criminal courts that the case
stood alone on the basis of crimes against humanity committed as
part of a systematic attack against the civilian population. In the
situation of Ivory Coast, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed that it
believed that the attack carried out by pro-Gbagbo forces against the
civilian population was widespread and systematic. 15 1 Interestingly,
in reaching its conclusion that both requirements of the attack were
met, the judges were only guided by the characteristics of a
widespread attack (i.e., extended period time period in which the
crimes were carried out, the geographic range of the alleged crimes,
and the high number of victims). 15 2 It seems that once the
widespread requirement has been proven, the judges assumed that
the systematic nature of the attack is also present.
In another situation of post-election violence, the Pre-Trial
Chamber only addressed the existence of the widespread nature of
the attack. This demonstrates that the jurisprudence as to what
constitutes a "systematic" attack alone is underdeveloped and yet to
be crystallized in the practice of the ICC. Hence, it is even more
unfortunate that the ICC Prosecutor dismissed the situation at the
early stage, without providing the judges with an opportunity to

98.

147.

OTP Report, supra note 73,

148.

Id.,

149.

Id.

150.

Id., T100.

151.
152.

Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 62.
Id.

99.
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construe whether the evidence of the Maydan crimes supports the
systematic attack threshold required for crimes against humanity.
The conclusion of the ICC Prosecutor on the absence of the systematic
nature of the attack is also at odds with its earlier findings on the
existence of the organized state policy to quell the protests and the
selective targeting of individuals for their dissent with the
government policies.1 5 3 These findings are clearly indicative of a
systematic nature of the attack.
To sum up, the crimes committed during the Maydan protests
appear to meet the threshold of crimes against humanity in the Rome
Statute, and an overly stringent approach with respect to the
interpretation of the systematic nature of the attack advanced by the
ICC Prosecutor seems to be totally unjustified and defeating the
interests of justice. The ICC Prosecutor also failed to consider that
the Maydan crimes have left a lasting impact upon victims, surviving
family members, and the public, which renders it even more
important to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for
unleashing violence against the civilians who took part in the
protests.
2. Jurisdiction and Admissibility under Article 17 of the Statute?
In order to meet the requirements of Article 53(1), it is necessary
to prove that the case is admissible before the ICC. 15 4 Although the
ICC Prosecutor did not go as far as to address the remaining
requirements for the initiation of an investigation, the author of this
Article will attempt to demonstrate that such prerequisites have been
met. First and foremost, the crime must occur on the territory of a
state that lodged a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute, or a national of that state must have committed the
offense.1 55 In the situation of Ukraine, it appears that both ratione
loci and ratione personae are fulfilled, as the crimes were committed
on the territory of Ukraine, and Ukrainian senior officials were
allegedly implicated in directing the crimes against the civilians who
took part in the protests. Despite the fact that many former senior
Ukrainian officials, suspected of the crimes, fled the country and
reportedly obtained Russian citizenship, the nationality issue would
not be a jurisdictional barrier to the investigation of the alleged
crimes given that the proof of ratione loci is sufficient per se.
Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute provide conditions
for the admissibility of a case before the ICC. 1 5 6 Despite the

153.
154.
admissible
155.
156.

90, 93.
OTP Report, supra note 73,
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(b) ("[T]he case is or would be
under Article 17.").
Id., art. 12(2).
Id., art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
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references to the admissibility of "case," it has been earlier expounded
in the ICC jurisprudence that at the early stage of proceedings, when
suspects have not been identified, a determination of admissibility
involves consideration of one or more potential cases within the
broader context of the "situation." 15 7 Article 17(1)(a) and (b) specify
that the case is inadmissible where (a) it is being investigated or
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it or (b) it has been
investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over it, and the state has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned. 158 However, despite
the existence of ongoing national proceedings, the case is admissible
if the state concerned is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out
the investigation or prosecution. 15 9 The twofold test, which includes
the examination of the progress of national proceedings before
turning to questions of unwillingness or inability, has been decisively
160
confirmed by the ICC Appeals Chamber.
In the context of the situation of Ukraine, the Pre-Trial Chamber
would be required to review whether national proceedings are or have
been conducted "in relation to the individuals and crimes that are
likely to constitute the Court's future case(s)."' 16 1 In a recent
statement, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko expressed his
dissatisfaction with the progress of investigations of the Maydan
crimes and noted that the first cases have already reached Ukrainian
courts, while expressing concern about the organizers of the crimes
managing to flee the country and obtain safe haven in neighboring
Russia. 162

The Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) made public the
information on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed
during the Maydan protests. 163 With respect to the use of force
against demonstrating students on November 30, 2013, the PGO
issued indictments under Article 340 (unlawful interference with the
organization of public gatherings and demonstrations) 164 and Article

157.
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast supra note 118, §§ 190-91; Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Kenya, supra note 123, § 48.
158.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
159.
Id.
160.
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 OA8,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case § 78 (Sept. 25, 2009).
161.
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 194.
162.
HopomeHKO HC3aaOBOrleHHH TeMIIaMH po3cniyBaHHa 3RIOqHHiB IPOTH MaAiAaHy
('Poroshenko is Not Satisfied with the Progress of the Investigation of the Maidan
Crimes'),
BBC (July
9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/newsjin_brief/
2015/07/150709rlporashenkomaydan [perma.cc/K2P4-YCT2] (archived Jan. 20,
2016).
163.
PGO, supra note 134.
164.
According to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, an act must have been
authorized by a public official or was accompanied by the use of physical force. The
penalty includes the deprivation of liberty up to five years. Criminal Code of Ukraine,
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365 (3) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power by a representative of a
1 65
law enforcement agency that entailed serious consequences)
against fifteen senior government officials, including the former
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanykovych and the former Minister of
Interior Affairs Vitaliy Zakharchenko. 16 6 Another incident of the
unlawful use of force against demonstrators by the special riot police
unit on December 1, 2013, is still under investigation, with the four
167
low-ranking police officers identified as suspects in that regard.
With respect to the incident of the excessive use of force on December
10-11, 2013, the two Berkut officers have been identified as
suspects. 168 As to the willful killings and intentional infliction of
serious bodily harm against protesters that were commonplace in
January and February 2014, the PGO issued indictments on the
charges of aggravated murder under Article 115(2) of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine against senior public officials, including the former
President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and the former Minister of
Interior Affairs, Vitaliy Zakharchenko. 169 The former General
Prosecutor of Ukraine, Viktor Pshonka, was charged with abuse of
power that entails serious consequences under Article 364 (2) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine. 170

art. 340, http://www.legislationonline.org/documents/action/popup/id/16257/preview
[perma. ccfM638-N44M1] (archived Feb. 9, 2016).
165.
The penalty includes the deprivation of liberty up to ten years and ban on
exercising certain functions for the period up to three years. Criminal Code of Ukraine,
art. 365(3), http:/www.legislationline.orgldocuments/actionpopup/id/16257/preview
[perma. cc/M638-N44M1] (archived, Feb. 9, 2016).
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
166.
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnihprovadzhengolovne-slidche -upravlinnj a-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukraini/rozgin- student
skogo-majdanu-30-11-2013/ [perma.cc/HH66-TN77] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (providing
an account of criminal proceedings with respect to dispersing the Maydan student
protests on 30 November 2013).
167.
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnihprovadzhengolovne-slidche-upravlinnja-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukrainiprotystoyanny
a-l-grudnya-2013-roku-na-vulytsi-bI [perma.cc/2ET2-EZ23] (archived Jan. 24, 2016)
(providing an account of criminal proceedings with respect to the clashes on Bankova
street in Kyiv on 1 December 2013)
168.
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnihprovadzhenrgolovne-slidche-upravlinnja-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukraini/rozgin-aktsiyiprotestu-10-11-grudnya-2013-roku-v/ [perma.cc/7TL5-A6TA] (archived Jan. 24, 2016)
(providing an account of criminal proceedings with respect to dispersing the protests in
Kyiv on 10-11 December 2013).
169.
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnihprovadzhen/golovne-slidche-upravlinnja-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukrainistorinka- 1/
[hereinafter PGO Maydan 2014] [perma.cc/9JVA-AP3B] (archived Jan. 24, 2016)
(providing an account of criminal proceedings with respect to the killings and inflicting
serious injuries during the Maydan protests in January-February 2014).
170.
Id.
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The cases that reached Ukrainian courts mostly concern
individuals who are low-ranking perpetrators. The Kyiv city district
court (Svyatoshyn district) is currently hearing the joint case against
the special police unit officers who were charged with aggravated
murder (Article 115(2) of the Criminal Code), abuse of authority that
entailed serious consequences (Article 365(3) of the Criminal Code),
and unlawful obtaining of weapons, explosive devices, and
ammunition through the abuse of authority (Article 262(2) of the
Criminal Code). 1 71 However, at the time of writing this Article, no
verdicts have been delivered. 172 However, the proceedings against the
Ukrainian senior officials have been halted for procedural reasons, as
their whereabouts are officially unknown. In January 2015, Interpol
issued a red notice for the former President of Ukraine Viktor
Yanukovych, albeit only in relation to the charges of embezzlement
and misappropriation, which is of no significance with respect to the
73
prospective ICC proceedings. 1
At first glance, it does appear that the cases with respect to the
Maydan crimes are being investigated by Ukrainian authorities.
However, it may be questioned whether the first limb of the twopronged admissibility test is satisfied-that is, whether the case is
being investigated by Ukrainian national authorities, given that the
national proceedings mostly concern the crimes related to the abuse
of authority, and progress has only been made with respect to the
charges levied against low-ranked perpetrators. 17 4 Further, the ICC
Appeals Chamber held that "the national investigation must cover
the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in
the proceedings before the Court." 175 Whereas at the preliminary
stage of the authorization of an investigation, "the same person" test,
in the absence of the accused, does not require further consideration,
it is necessary to remark on the interpretation of "substantially the
same conduct." The matter was brought to the fore during the
Gaddafi admissibility proceedings, in which the Pre-Trial Chamber
concluded that Libya did not have to investigate the same
international crimes, as it sufficed that the domestic proceedings

171.
The information is available on the official website of the Prosecutor
General's Office of Ukraine (in Ukrainian) at http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/stan-sudovogo[hereinafter
PGO
Kyiv]
rozgljadu/vbyvstva-pid-chas-masovyh-aktsij-protes/
[perma.cc/UR9N-WMUQ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (providing status updates on the
progress of judicial proceeding with respect to the killings of protesters in Kyiv).
172.
See id.

173.

INTERPOL Issues Red Notices for Former Ukrainian leaders, INTERPOL

2015),
http://www.interpol.intNews-and-media/News/2015/N2015-002
(Jan.
12,
[https://perma.cc/DF22-WP3M] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
174.
PGO Maydan 2014, supranote 169.
175.
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-274 OA, Appeals Chamber 1 36 (Aug. 30,
2011).
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17 6
focused on the alleged conduct and not its legal characterization.
However, it was not the difference in labelling the crimes and the
dichotomy between domestic and international crimes that led the
Pre-Trial Chamber to conclude that Libya was not investigating the
same case, but the fact that it was only investigating some "discrete
aspects" of the case before the Court that the Appeals Chamber did
not oppose. 177 If one assumes, albeit hypothetically, that murder
charges levied against Ukrainian senior officials and national efforts
with respect to the investigation of such crimes suffice in
demonstrating that the case is being investigated at the national
level, the next step would be to turn to the question of the genuine
willingness or ability of Ukraine to investigate the crimes in question.
At first sight, it does appear that Ukraine is willing to prosecute
the crimes, but this has been questioned by the Council of Europe
(CoE) international advisory panel, tasked with overseeing domestic
investigations of the violent incidents during the Maydan protests
and its conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights,
which issued a damning statement, concluding that "in many
respects, the investigations have failed to satisfy the requirements of
the European Convention of Human Rights."'178 The conclusions of
the report scrutinize the investigations undertaken prior to and after
February 22, 2014. The panel noted that "there was no genuine
attempt, prior to 22 February 2014, to pursue investigations into the
acts of violence during the Maydan demonstrations," which entailed
substantial challenges for the investigations that commenced at a
later stage. 179 With respect to the investigations after February 22,
2014, the panel concluded that "substantial progress has not been
made," which was explained by serious investigative deficiencies in
the work of the prosecutor's office both at the level of the PGO and
local prosecutorial divisions, as well as the lack of cooperation

Prosecutor v. Saif KE-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah A-Senussi, ICC-01/11176.
01/11-344-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I 85 (May 31, 2013) (decision on the admissibility
of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi).
134; see also Prosecutor v. Saif KE-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AId.
177.
Senussi, ICC-01/11-01I11-547-Red OA 4, Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled "Decision on the admissibility
of the case against Saif !E-Islam Gaddafi (May 21, 2014), § 77; Separate Opinion by
Song, J. (concluding that Libya was investigating the same case), and Dissenting
Opinion by Usacka, J. (disagreeing with Pre-Trial Chamber's test for determining
whether Libya was investigating the same case).
Council of Europe, International Advisory Panel's Report Says Maidan
178.
Investigations Failed to Satisfy Requirements of European Convention on Human
Rights (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/international-advisory-panel-sreport-says-maidan-investigations-failed-to-satisfy-requirements-of-european-conventionon-human-rights [perma.cc/H2Y2-DY8K] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
Id.
179.
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between law enforcement authorities in the investigation of
crimes. 180
The CoE report on the progress of national proceedings with
respect to the Maydan protests casts doubt on Ukraine's willingness
to prosecute the crimes in question. 18 1 One of the three indicators of
the state's unwillingness, as outlined by the Rome Statute, is that "(a)
the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which,
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice." 182 In this regard, "serious investigative
deficiencies," as identified by the CoE panel, indicate the violation of
the principle of due process and therefore seem to fall under the
unwillingness criterion in the Rome Statute.
Although the ICC is not bound to investigate the acts of suspects
who were named in the declaration, it would seem natural for the
ICC Prosecutor to initiate proceedings against those who bear the
greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes and go after the socalled "big fish." As mentioned in this Article, the most senior
Ukrainian officials accused of directing and ordering the Maydan
crimes are currently on the run and are speculated to have
abandoned the territory of Ukraine and fled to neighboring Russia. 183
In the absence of cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian
authorities with respect to the investigation of the Maydan crimes,
Ukraine is unable to obtain the accused in order to proceed with the
national prosecution of the crimes. This situation is indicative of
Ukraine's inability to investigate the crimes within the meaning of
Article 17 (3) of the Rome Statute. 184 In the context of admissibility
proceedings in the Gaddafi case, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that it
was necessary to assess the ability of a state to genuinely carry out
an investigation or prosecution "in the context of the relevant
national system and procedures." 18 5 It concluded that Libya was

180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (2) (explaining that another two
indicators of unwillingness are "(a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken or
the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in
article 5; (b) there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.").
183.
PGO Maydan 2014, supranote 169.
184.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (3) ("In order to determine inability in
a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain
the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out
its proceedings.").
185,
Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/ll01/11-344-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I 200 (May 31, 2013) (decision on the admissibility
of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi).
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unable to investigate the case in light of the- challenges it encountered
with respect to "exercising its judicial powers fully across the entire
186
territory," and in particular it was unable to obtain the accused.
3. Gravity and Interests of Justice
At the preliminary stage of the authorization of an investigation,
the "gravity" requirement is evaluated in a general sense against the
backdrop of the entire situation as well as against the backdrop of
potential case(s) within the context of that situation. 1 87 As mentioned
in the ICC jurisprudence, the parameters of a potential case could be
defined with respect to:
(i) whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely to be the object
of the investigation include those who may bear the greatest responsibility for
the alleged crimes committed and (ii) the gravity of the crimes committed
within the incidents which are likely to be the object of an investigation
(including, inter alia, their scale and nature, the manner in which they were
carried out, their impact on the victims, and any aggravating
circumstances). 188

In the context of the situation in Ukraine, available information on
the individuals who were associated with the Maydan crimes
indicates that a number of former senior government officials played
a crucial role in authorizing and directing violent attacks against the
civilians who took part in the protests. 189 Whereas the national
proceedings against direct perpetrators implicated in murder and
other violent crimes are progressing at a slow pace, all cases against
senior officials are at the moment halted in light of their unknown
whereabouts. 19 0 The crimes committed by law enforcement agencies,
on orders from senior officials, may fall within a broad range of
underlying acts of crimes against humanity. As earlier argued by the
author, they seem to have been committed in the context of a
systematic targeting of demonstrators as part of an official plan to
quell any form of dissent in the country. 19 1 The crimes left an
indelible mark on victims, surviving relatives, and the Ukrainian
population, all of whom still struggle to come to terms with what
happened and demand justice for the wrongdoings of the former

186.
Id. 205.
187.
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 202.
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 204; Pre-Trial
188.
Chamber II, Kenya, supra note 123, § 59.
PGO, supra note 134.
189.
190.
PGO Maydan 2014, supra note 169; PGO Kyiv, supra note 171.
191.
See infra Section IV(B)(1).
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regime. 19 2 There are no reasons to believe that the authorization into
the situation would not be in the interest of justice.
Due to the procedural halt of the national proceedings against
the Ukrainian senior officials who allegedly bear the greatest
responsibility for the crimes during the Maydan protests but fled the
country to evade the prosecution, as well as the gravity of the crimes
committed during the protests, and their impact on the victims and
population in Ukraine, it appears reasonable that the Pre-Trial
Chamber, if had been requested by the ICC Prosecutor, would been
have been satisfied that the requirement has been met.

V. DECLARATION ACCEPTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC FOR THE
ALLEGED CRIMES IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND CRIMEA (DECLARATION

II)

As mentioned above, one of the problematic aspects of the first
declaration is that it narrowly focused on the alleged crimes
orchestrated by senior Ukrainian officials against fellow Ukrainians
during the Maydan protests. The temporal jurisdiction of the
declaration did not cover any crimes beyond February 2014 and left
out the alleged crimes associated with the chain of dramatic events
that unfolded following former President Yanukovych's removal from
office, such as the annexation of Crimea and the self-proclamation of
independence by pro-Russian rebel groups in Lugansk and Donetsk
Republics. 193 Since April 2014, there has been ongoing fighting
between Ukrainian government troops and pro-Russian separatist
groups, with the former claiming to be conducting an antiterrorist
offensive against pro-Russian rebels in its attempt to regain control
over the rebel occupied parts of eastern Ukraine.
The fighting in eastern Ukraine gained international prominence
following the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on
July 17, 2014.194 The flight was brought down over the rebel-occupied
195
territory and claimed the lives of the 298 passengers on board.
Following the tragic incident, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) issued an official statement calling all sides to respect
international humanitarian law, in which it reiterated the absolute

192.

Thousands Take Part in Commemoration of EuroMaidan Revolution's

Anniversary, KYIVPOST
NEWS
(Feb.
21,
2015),
http://www.kyivpost.com/
multimedia/photo/thousands-of-people-take-part-in-memorialceremony-marking-thefirst-euromaidan-anniversary-381439.html [perma.ccN92U-ZJK3] (archived Jan. 24,

2016); Ukraine Marks Anniversary of Maidan Revolution of Dignity, UNIAN NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.unian.info/politics/1012208-ukraine-marks-anniversary-ofmaidan'revolution-of-dignity.html [perma.cc/2TPH-RWB6] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
193.
UKRAINE: TIMELINE OF EVENTS, supranote 74.
194.
Dutch Safety Board Report, 'Crash of Malaysia Airlines MH17: Hrabove,
Ukraine, 17 July 2014', The Hague, October 2015.
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prohibition of directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects
during an armed conflict. 196 In its statement, the ICRC for the first
time explicitly qualified the conflict in Ukraine as a non-international
armed conflict. 19 7 Similar, in the context of reporting on the attacks
in eastern Ukraine, the nongovernmental organization (NGO)
Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that "the fighting in eastern
Ukraine is governed by the laws of war applicable to all parties of the
conflict and individuals who commit serious violations of the law of
war ... are responsible for war crimes." 198 The nature of the conflict
in eastern Ukraine is widely debated due to the alleged Russian
involvement in supporting the pro-Russian separatist groups, in
particular whether the extent of such involvement transforms the
conflict into an international armed conflict. 199
Whereas the legal qualification of the conflict is of no significance
with respect to the first declaration lodged by Ukraine to the ICC,
given its narrow temporal jurisdiction, the situation was drastically
changed when the Ukrainian government submitted a new
declaration that recognized the jurisdiction of the Court over the
alleged crimes committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. 20 0 As
stated in this second declaration, it was submitted "for the purpose of
bringing senior officials of the Russian Federation and leaders of
terrorist organizations 'DNR' and 'LNR' . . . in respect of crimes
against humanity and war crimes . .. committed on the territory of
Ukraine from 20 February 2014 and to the present time." 20 1 As in the
case with the first declaration, the ICC Prosecutor will have to decide
whether to request the judges' authorization to open an investigation
into the situation on the basis of the available evidence. At first sight,
the declaration seems to have remedied the deficiency of the first
declaration by accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC from February

196.
Press Release, ICRC, Ukraine: ICRS Calls on All Sides to Respect
International Humanitarian Saw (July 23, 2014), www.icrc.org/englresources/
documents/news-release/2014/07-23-ukraine-kiev-call-respect-ihl-repatriate-bodiesmalaysian-airlines.htm [perma.cc/8K3J-V6DZ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
197.
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Ukraine: Unguided Rockets Killing Civilians, HRW NEWS RELEASE (July
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[perma.cc/BU7H-2KEP] (archived Jan 24, 2016).
199.
Eastern Ukraine: Questions and Answers About the Laws of War, HRW
NEWS RELEASE (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/easternukraine-questions-and-answers-about-laws-war
[perma.cc/K9MN-PGKK]
(archived
Jan. 24, 2016); Noelle Quenivet, Trying to Classify the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine,
INTLAWGRRLS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://ilg2.org/2014/08/28/trying-to-classify-the-conflictin-eastern-ukraine/ [perma.cc/FXW7-VZER] (archived Jan. 24, 2016); Ilya Nuzov &
Anne Quintin, The Case of Russia's Detention of Ukrainian Military Pilot Savchenko
under IHL, EJIL: TALK (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.orglthe-case-of-russiasdetention-of-ukrainian-military-pilot-savchenko-under-ihlI
[perma.cc/5NHG-BDUM]
(archived Jan. 24, 2016).
200.
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2014 onwards for an indefinite period of time. However, the
declaration raises a number of interesting legal issues, which are
addressed below. For instance, as discussed previously with regard to
the first declaration, the second declaration too brings up the
question of who is entitled to sign the declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the ICC on behalf of the state. 20 2 Despite Article 106 of
the Constitution of Ukraine conferring upon the Ukrainian President
the power to represent the state in international relations, administer
foreign policy, conduct negotiations, and conclude international
treaties, the second declaration is atypically signed by the
chairperson of the Ukrainian parliament. 20 3 Unlike with the first
declaration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expressly laid
out the grounds that, in their view, permitted the chairperson of
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, acting in his capacity as ex officio Head
of State, to sign the declaration; it is not clearly set out as to why the
second declaration was not signed by the incumbent President Petro
20 4
Poroshenko.
A. Internationalor Non-InternationalArmed Conflict in Eastern
Ukraine?
As mentioned above, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is widely
considered by the international community as being a noninternational armed conflict, which is understood as "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State." 20 5 In order to
distinguish a non-international armed conflict from other less serious
forms of violence or internal disturbances, two criteria are evaluated
in order to determine whether an armed conflict exists, in particular
(a) the intensity of fighting and (b) the organization of the parties
involved. 20 6 The fighting between Ukrainian government forces and
pro-Russian separatist groups, in its intensity and the organization of
parties, has been recognized as meeting the threshold of a non-

202.
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204.
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205.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction § 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
206.
See Judgment, Bogkoski (IT-04-82-T), Trial Chamber, 10 July 208, § 175;
Judgment, DelaliW (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, § 184; Judgment,
Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, §§ 619-620.

20161

IMPLICATIONS OFAD HOCJURISDICTION

international armed conflict by international organizations and
2 07
NGOs.
However, the legal qualification of the conflict in eastern
Ukraine has been challenged in light of the alleged continuous supply
of weapons and soldiers by the Russian government. 20 8 What
remains unclear is whether the Russian involvement amounts to
being "in control of' the rebel fighting in Ukraine and, therefore,
transforms the nature of the conflict to an international armed
conflict. Under international humanitarian law, intervention by
another state that supports an armed opposition group(s) to the
conflict may internationalize the armed conflict, provided that the
state providing such support to the armed group(s) is in control of
military operations conducted by the group(s). 2 09 Although it is

widely reported that the Russian Federation has been supplying
weapons to the rebel groups in eastern Ukraine, the extent of its
involvement, in particular whether it goes beyond financing and
equipping rebel groups, remains uncertain. The Russian government
officials have on many occasions denied the supply of weapons and
210
manpower to the rebel groups in eastern Ukraine.
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By alleging the responsibility of senior officials of the Russian
Federation, the declaration suggests that the conflict in Ukraine is of
international character. 2 1 1 Under international humanitarian law, an
international armed conflict "exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States."2 12 In light of the absence of an officially
declared state of war between Russia and Ukraine, the lack of clarity
as to the extent of the Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine, and
the question of whether it satisfies the "overall control" test, the legal
qualification of the conflict is far from settled. Should the ICC
Prosecutor decide to proceed with the case, she would have some
difficult decisions to make with respect to the qualification of the
conflict, as such a determination directly affects the possible choice of
war crimes charges. The qualification of the conflict has far greater
implications, as its recognition as an international armed conflict
could entail bringing charges against nationals of the state that has a
seat as a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). Such a qualification is fraught with serious consequences, as
it may potentially shudder the entire foundation upon which
international law and diplomacy are erected.
B. War Crimes in Eastern Ukraine
Since the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the number
of casualties has soared to a staggering 25,439.21 3 According to the
latest UN figures, this includes at least 7,833 deaths and at least
17,610 injured in eastern Ukraine. 2 14 In general terms, the
declaration lodged by Ukraine describes the situation of thousands of
Ukrainian nationals being killed, injured, as well as hundreds of
thousands being forced out of their homes as a result of the
conflict. 2 15 It further provides one example of an incident of war
crimes-that is, the shelling of civilians in residential areas of
Mariupol on January 24, 2015, that claimed the lives of thirty
civilians. 2 16 Although the chosen incident, as a way to illustrate the
commission of war crimes in Ukraine, is no doubt important, it stands
(archived Jan. 24, 2016). See also the statement of the Russian Vice Prime Minister
Dmitriy Rogozin, who publicly declared that the Russian Federation was not supplying
any weapons to Ukraine to avoid it being used against the citizens of Ukraine in July of
2015,
http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1434411/
(in Russian)
[perma.cc/9LGZ-FSHF]
(archived Jan. 24, 2016).
211.
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212.
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Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction § 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
213.
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 12 (July 15,
2015), §34, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/CountriesUA/llthOHCHRreportUkraine.
pdf (last visited Sept. 2015) [perma.cc/8AH4-J6Q8] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
214.
Id.
215.
Declaration II, supra note 67.
216.
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out oddly on a one-page declaration, given the widely documented
instances of serious violations of international humanitarian law by
international organizations and NGOs. 2 17 Despite its mention in the
second declaration, the ICC Prosecutor is not obliged to investigate
just one instance of war crimes as identified by the declaration but is
obliged to investigate all instances of war crimes that fall within the
2 18
scope of the declaration.
The drafters of the second declaration avoided some mistakes
associated with the first declaration by refraining from naming
suspects of the alleged crimes. However, they do allege responsibility

See AMNESTY INT'L, UKRAINE REPORT (2014), http://www.amnesty.org/
217.
[https:/lperma.cc/2UJVenlcountries/europe-and-central-asialukraine/report-ukraine
9QWW] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (recounting the abduction and ill-treatment of
captives in parts of eastern Ukraine controlled by separatists, summary killings by
each side to the conflict; use of residential areas and buildings as firing positions by
separatist forces and pro-Kyiv forces returning fire to these positions, downing of a
Ukrainian military plane by separatist forces on July 17, 2014); Ukraine:
Overwhelming New Evidence of Prisoners Being Tortured and Killed Amid Conflict,
AMNESTY INT'L (May 22, 2015), www.amnesty.org/enllatest/news/2015/05/ukraine-newevidence-prisoneRS-tortured-and-killed-amid-conflict [perma.ccJL5R4-UAES] (archived
Jan. 24, 2016) (reporting on ongoing war crimes committed by both sides to the conflict,
including torture and summary killings of prisoners); New Evidence of Summary
Killings of Ukrainian Soldiers Must Spark Urgent Investigation, AMNESTY INT'L (April
9, 2015), www.amnesty.orglenllatestlnews/2015/04/ukraine-new-evidence-of- summary[perma.cc/GYL3killings-of-captured-soldieRS-must-spark-urgent-investigations/
AAEJ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Ukraine:
Insurgents Disrupt Medical Services (Aug. 5, 2015), www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/05/
ukraine-insurgents-disrupt-medical-services) [perma.cc/K8PG-2WF3] (archived on Jan.
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[perma.cc/858Q-QBSZ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (reporting on the alleged use of white
phosphorus as an incendiary weapon by Ukrainian forces); Intense Fightingin Eastern
Ukraine 'Extremely Alarming' Says Pillay, as UN Releases News Report, U.N. OFFICE
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (July 28, 2014), www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14908&LangID=E [perma.cc/UE83.3RD3] (archived Jan.
24, 2016) (reporting on unlawful abductions and detention, including ill-treatment,
torture, killing of detainees, loss of civilian lives and serious damage to civilian
infrastructure); Ole Solvang, Dispatches:Marking Ukrainian Independence Day with a
Laws-of-War Violation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 24, 2014), www.hrw.org/
news/2014/08/24/dispatches-marking-ukrainian-independence-day-laws-war-violation
[perma.cc[M3BJ-UXVF] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (reporting on violations of Geneva
Convention's common article 3 by pro-Russian armed forces in Donetsk); Ukraine:More
Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 19, 2015),
www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/19/ukraine-more-civilians-killed-cluster-munition-attacks
[perma.cc/B7ER-9T4P] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (reporting on the use of cluster
munitions in eastern Ukraine); Dispatches: More Cluster Munition Use in Ukraine,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 4, 2015), www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/04/dispatches-morecluster-munition-use-ukraine [perma.cc/CQS9-85J6] (archived Jan. 24, 2016); Iryna
Gudyma, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 3
February 2015: Civilians Killed and Wounded in Strike with Cluster Munitions in
www.osce.org/ukraineIzvestkova Street in Luhansk City, OSCE (Feb. 3, 2015),
smm/138906 [perma.cc/5NSX-CBFT] (archived Jan. 24, 2015).
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of "senior officials of the Russian Federation" and "leaders of terrorist
organizations DNR and LNR., 2 19 Although the Ukrainian
government has declared DNR and LNR to be terrorist organizations,
this is of no significance with respect to an investigation conducted by
the ICC, as it does not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
2 20
terrorism, which is normally prosecuted by national jurisdictions.
Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor is not obligated to limit its
preliminary examination to the responsibility of parties that have
been identified in the declaration. By nature of its mandate, the
Prosecutor will have to examine the responsibility of all parties to the
conflict, including the responsibility of Ukrainian armed forces. In
this regard, it is important to recall that, on many occasions,
nongovernmental organizations have attributed responsibility to both
Ukrainian government and separatist forces for indiscriminate
attacks against the civilian population for their use of weapons that
are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military objects
22 1
with sufficient accuracy.
C. Annexation of Crimea and Its Significance for DeclarationH
The second declaration speaks of the "Russian Federation's ...
armed aggression against Ukraine," evidenced by the annexation of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 222 This Article does not discuss
whether the annexation of Crimea constitutes an act of aggression,
which is a matter of public international law, 22 3 but looks into
whether the alleged crimes associated with the annexation may be
prosecuted by the ICC. At the outset, it should be noted that the ICC
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression before
January 2017. Therefore, it is not in a position to make a
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determination as to whether the Russian officials could be held
individually responsible for the crime of aggression. 224 The only
available international judicial institution that can rule on whether
the annexation of Crimea constitutes an act of aggression under
international law is the International Court of Justice, which
adjudicates the disputes between states. 2 25 Such discussion, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article as it warrants separate, in depth
analysis.
With respect to the situation in Crimea, it could be questioned
whether the annexation of its territory by the Russian Federation
transforms the situation into an international armed conflict. In the
absence of open armed hostilities between Ukraine and Russia on the
territory of Crimea, it seems illogical to conclude that such an
international armed conflict exists. However, the presence of Russian
troops who exercise effective control in Crimea qualifies the Russian
Federation as an occupying power under the law of international
occupation. 22 6 Under international humanitarian law, the territory is
considered occupied when it comes under effective control of foreign
22 7
armed forces, even in the absence of an armed resistance.
Despite the statutory constraints with respect to the crime of
aggression, the Office of the Prosecutor may evaluate whether the
widely reported violations of human rights on the Crimean Peninsula
could constitute crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Various human rights groups have voiced concerns about human
rights violations that manifest themselves in discriminatory policies
directed against ethnic, religious, or national groups opposed to the
annexation-in particular indigenous Crimean tatars-as well as
journalists and representatives of nongovernmental organizations
who report on the situation on the Peninsula. 22 8 There have been
documented instances of enforced disappearances, harassment,
detention, and prosecution of Crimean tatars and pro-Ukrainian
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activists. 22 9 Persecution against any identifiable group, enforced
disappearances, and other inhumane acts-if committed in the
context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian
population-may amount to crimes against humanity within the
meaning of the Rome Statute and, therefore, are subject to the
Prosecutor's preliminary investigation.
D. Missed Opportunities in DeclarationII
The downing of the Malaysian airlines plane over the rebelcontrolled area in eastern Ukraine proved to be a turning point in the
conflict and prompted the international community to openly
recognize the conflict to be governed by the rules of international
humanitarian law. In the aftermath of the tragic incident, the states
whose nationals lost lives (The Netherlands, Malaysia, Australia, and
Belgium) and Ukraine, on whose territory it occurred, submitted a
request to the UN Security Council seeking the establishment of an
international criminal tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
to "try those responsible for crimes connected to the downing that
occurred over Ukraine on 17 July 2014."230 Russia vetoed the
resolution on the establishment of the tribunal, having proposed an
alternative draft resolution that backed the UN investigation of the
incident but fell short of calling for the establishment of an
international tribunal. 23 1 Following the failed attempt in the UNSC,
the states that requested an international tribunal declared that they
would probe into alternative prosecution mechanisms to try those
23 2
responsible for shooting down the civilian aircraft.
The act of downing the aircraft committed in the context of an
armed conflict, which resulted in the loss of civilian lives, may
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amount to a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. When
Ukraine lodged its second declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the
ICC from February 2014 onwards, this would have provided an ideal
alternative prosecution mechanism to the proposed international
tribunal project that was stalled in the UNSC. However, a careful
reading of the declaration leads to the conclusion that the prosecution
of the downing of the plane is not possible, since the declaration
restricts rationae personae only to Ukrainian nationals who were
subject to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, thus
excluding those nationals from other states who perished in the
incident. What remains unclear is whether the OTP is bound by the
limitation with respect to rationae personae as stipulated in the
declaration, as they have to investigate all instances of the crimes
during the period of time outlined in the declaration.

VI. CONCLUDING WORDS

The relationship between Ukraine and the ICC seems to have
improved with the Ukrainian government lodging the declaration on
the acceptance of the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC initially, with
respect to the Maydan crimes, and subsequently, with respect to
crimes associated with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. However, the
implications of the ad hoc jurisdiction acceptance are far from clear,
as it is at odds with the earlier ruling of the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine that found the Rome Statute to be contrary to the
Constitution of Ukraine. All attempts to amend the Constitution of
Ukraine in order to accommodate the jurisdiction of the ICC have so
far been unsuccessful. If Ukraine is to avoid a situation where the
investigation into the situation is stalled by the Constitutional
Court's ruling on the Rome Statute's noncompliance with the
Ukrainian constitution, it must accelerate its efforts to make the
necessary amendments to its constitution that would allow for the
ratification of the Rome Statute. By committing to the ratification of
the Rome Statute, Ukraine will demonstrate its unwavering
commitment to international law, which cannot be more timely and
relevant when viewed against the backdrop of the ongoing bloodshed
in eastern Ukraine.
Most recently, the ICC Prosecutor decided not to act on the first
declaration, concluding that the Maydan crimes had not satisfied the
"widespread or systematic" requirement of the attack within the
meaning of crimes against humanity. This gives the impression that
the interests of justice have been overtaken by a very narrow
interpretation as to what constitutes a systematic attack in the
context of crimes against humanity. However, this may not be the
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last word in the story, as Ukraine expressed its willingness to provide
additional evidence with respect to the Maydan crimes.
While the first declaration has been shelved by the ICC
Prosecutor, it remains to be seen what steps will be taken by the OTP
with respect to the second declaration that touches upon some
sensitive political issues, in particular the extent of the Russian
involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Most hopefully, the
heavy weight of the two declarations lodged by Ukraine would exert
pressure on the ICC Prosecutor to act at least on the second
declaration. A decision by the Prosecutor to not act on either of the
declarations would be surprising, especially against the backdrop of
the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, which takes place at the
heart of Europe and is marred by widespread war crimes allegations
documented by international organizations and NGOs. The
implications of requesting the authorization of an investigation into
the situation of Ukraine should not be underestimated, as it is a
window of opportunity for the ICC prosecutor to move away from the
widely perceived "African bias" in the selection of cases and
demonstrate to the victims and the international community that the
Court is not sitting idle watching how the conflict unfolds and more
civilians lose their lives. While it took long seven years to request the
authorization of an investigation in the situation in Georgia, it is
hoped that the Prosecutor would be able to decide much sooner on
how to proceed with the second Ukraine's declaration, as it holds true
that "justice delayed is justice denied."

